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Abstract
The aviation system now depends on information technology more
than ever before to ensure safety and efficiency. To address concerns
about the efficacy of software aspects of the certification process, the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) began the Streamlining Software
Aspects of Certification (SSAC) program. The SSAC technical team was
commissioned to gather data, analyze results, and propose
recommendations to maximize efficiency and minimize cost and delay,
without compromising safety. The technical team conducted two public
workshops to identify and prioritize software approval issues, and
conducted a survey to validate the most urgent of those issues. The
SSAC survey, containing over two hundred questions about the FAA's
software approval process, reached over four hundred industry software
developers, aircraft manufacturers, and FAA designated engineering
representatives. Three hundred people responded. This report presents
the SSAC program rationale, survey process, preliminary findings, and
recommendations.
1. Introduction and Background
The final report from the RTCA Task Force 4 on Certification states that the failure of the FAA's
certification process to keep pace with the growth in aviation has resulted in increasing costs to the
manufacturing industry (ref. Final). Some industry representatives have complained that the certification
process requires an inordinate amount of time and expense, with some aspects of that process contributing
little or no value. In particular, the FAA has received numerous complaints about software aspects of the
certification process. To address software concerns, the FAA began the Streamlining Software Aspects of
Certification (SSAC) program, which established a technical team to determine whether the cost and time
associated with the software approval process can be reduced without compromising safety.
This report presents the preliminary findings from the first industry survey on the FAA's software
approval process, and recommendations to the FAA on ways to improve. The findings and
recommendations presented here are preliminary because further data collection through the SSAC
program will be needed to objectively substantiate or refute some of the results. Preliminary results are
presented, nevertheless, to initiate interchange with the FAA and the aviation software industry in hopes
of working together to develop an achievable plan for improvement.
Given the preliminary nature of the findings and recommendations, this report contains only a brief
summary of the SSAC program. Attention is focused primarily on disseminating the significant findings
from the survey to stimulate the process of making change. A final report, to be published at the end of
the program, will provide further detail on the SSAC program, data collection, results, and
recommendations.
1.1 Motivation for the SSAC Program
Concepts for a National Airspace System (NAS) are evolving because of continuing increases in
aviation activity and air travel worldwide. Advances in information technology provide the principal
enabling factor for achieving a truly unified airspace system. In a recent commentary in Aviation Week
& Space Technology (ref. Hughes), David Hughes wrote: "Information technology is becoming a key
partof everythingtheaerospaceanddefenseindustrydoesfor a living, andasthecenturyclosesit is
computersandsoftwarethat hold the keysto the future. Theindustryis beingtransformedfrom
dependenceon traditionalmanufacturingintosomethingthatlooksmorelike IBM andMicrosoftwith
wings." Ononehand,thisis goodbecauseinformationtechnologymakespossiblenewcapabilitiesuch
asCommunications/Navigation/Surveillancefor Air TrafficManagement(CNS/ATM),whichwill bethe
backboneof aunifiedairspacesystem.Ontheotherhand,keepingupwithnewtechnologyis difficult;
doingsoin acostefficientmannerisevenmoredifficult.
Addressingissuesrelatedto theapprovalof newtechnologiesi vital to thesuccessof theFAA's
modernizationi itiatives.In particular,theFAAmustgrapplewithtwomajorissues,namelythesafety
aspectsof theaviationsystemasa whole,andthecostof implementingnewtechnologies.Thesetwo
issuesarerelated.Accordingto CharlesHuettner(ref.Huettner):"Currentlyeachpartof the[aviation]
systemis evaluatedandcertifiedindependently,albeitremainingmindfulof whattheotherpartsare
doing. Overallsafetystandardsfor theaviationsystemasa wholedonotexist." In particular,thereis
little attentiononcertificationandsafetystandardsfor CNS/ATM.Significantimeandresourcesmust
beexpendedto definesuchsafetystandards.In turn,excessivecostandtimeburdenscannegatively
affectsafetyby causingdelaysin adoptingnew,safety-enhancingtechnologies.It is imperativethat
impactonsafetybeassessed,aseflbrtsto streamlinearerealized.
In short,thechallengeto theFAA tokeeppacewithnewtechnology,whileatthesametimeincrease
safetyanddecreasecost,isgreat.Thisreportfocusesonthesoftwareaspectsof thischallenge.
1.2 Overview of the SSAC Program
To address concerns about software aspects of certification, the FAA commissioned an independent
team of software engineering and safety experts to provide recommendations on ways to improve
software aspects of certification without compromising safety. The following are members of the SSAC
technical team: Cheryl Dorsey, independent Designated Engineering Representative from Digital Flight;
Kelly Hayhurst, Technical Program Manager from NASA Langley Research Center; John Knight,
professor from the Computer Science Department at the University of Virginia; Nancy Leveson,
professor from the Aeronautics and Astronautics Department at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology; and, Frank McCormick, independent Designated Engineering Representative from
Certification Services, Inc.
The technical team is an independent group tasked to research software issues and provide
recommendations to the FAA. The lack of direct industry participation is intentional, to reduce the
potential for bias towards or against particular companies. The lack of direct FAA participation is also
intentional to reduce undue influence. This does not mean, however, that the FAA is not participating
fully. The SSAC program is sponsored jointly by FAA AIO-2 and FAA AIR-130. Both Leanna Rierson,
Software Program Manager FAA AIR-130, and Ron Stroup, Software Safety and Certification Lead FAA
AIO-200, provide guidance to the technical team and coordinate with the program sponsor, Arthur Pyster,
Acting Deputy Assistant Administrator for Information Services and Chief Information Officer FAA
AIO-2.
The mission of the technical team is to gather, analyze, and synthesize objective evidence concerning
cost and schedule drivers for software aspects of certification, and provide recommendations to the FAA
on ways to improve without sacrificing safety. To determine the areas of concern about software aspects
of certification, the technical team conducted two public workshops in 1998 with industry and
government representatives involved in software. During SSAC Workshop I, participants identified more
than200individualconcernsaboutRTCA/DO-178BSoftware Considerations in Airborne Systems and
Equipment Certification (ref. RTCA) and other aspects of the approval process. All of these were
documented and summarized into the following 14 general issues to be considered by the technical team
for further data collection to determine the validity of the individual perceptions expressed at Workshop I.
1. Inconsistencies exist among Aircraft Certification Offices (ACOs) in interpreting and following
policy and guidance.
2. The effectiveness of some specific activities required by DO-178B is unclear.
3. DO-178B inadequately addresses the effect of software on the safety of the overall system.
4. Insufficient knowledge of software engineering and related disciplines exists within the FAA.
5. Requirements definition is difficult independent of certification.
6. Lack of cooperation exists between the FAA and industry.
7. The extent to which DO-178B provides benefits beyond those that are provided by other industry
accepted practices is unclear.
8. Insufficient knowledge of software engineering and related disciplines exists within industry.
9. Insufficient information is available about the certification process.
10. Inadequacies, inconsistencies, and inefficiencies exist in the Designated Engineering
Representative (DER) system.
11. DO-178B inadequately provides for innovation.
12. Problems exist within the Technical Standard Order (TSO), Type Certificate (TC), Supplemental
Type Certificate (STC), Amended Type Certificate (ATC), and Parts Manufacturing Approval
(PMA) processes.
13. Lack of cooperation among companies increases costs.
14. Working with certification authorities outside of the United States (e.g., the European Joint
Aviation Authorities) is difficult.
For brevity, this report does not provide the detailed individual concerns behind these general issues.
For a complete listing of the concerns expressed at Workshop I and the summarization strategy, see
Streamlining Software Aspects of Certification: Technical Team Report on the First Industry Workshop
(ref. Hayhurst).
Given the broad scope of each of the 14 general issues, extensive data collection to substantiate all of
them would burden both the collector and respondent. Consequently, SSAC Workshop II was held to
determine the issues industry considered to be the most important to study. Each Workshop II participant
was asked to identify the five most important issues for the technical team to investigate. The results
were collected and the 14 issues were ranked from most to least important.
Based on this ranking and recommendations from the FAA, the technical team pursued further data
collection in the following areas.
Interactions with ACOs and other approving authorities
- Issue 1. Inconsistencies exist among ACOs in interpreting and following policy and guidance.
- Issue 6. Lack of cooperation exists between the FAA and industry.
- Issue 9. Insufficient information is available about the certification process.
• SpecificactivitiesrequiredbyDO-178B,includingindependence,structuralcoverage,traceability,
documentation,qualityassurance,andtoolqualification
- Issue2. Theeffectivenessof somespecificactivitiesrequiredbyDO-178Bisunclear.
Safety
- Issue3. DO-178Binadequatelyaddressestheeffectof softwareonthesafetyoftheoverall
system.
• TheDERsystem
- Issue10.Inadequacies,inconsistencies,andinefficienciesexistin theDERsystem.
Therewerenomechanismsin placeto assurethatthoseattendingtheSSACworkshopsconstituteda
fair representationof the aviationsoftwarecommunityas a whole. Consequently,the workshop
informationalonedoesnot providea sufficientbasisfor developingrecommendationsfor potential
changesto theFANs softwareapprovalprocess.Instead,thedatagatheredattheworkshopservedto
honethedatacollectionprocessto focusonthemosturgentproblemareas.
1.3 SSAC Survey
The next step in data collection was to assure that the issues identified as most important to the
workshop participants were indeed significant issues for the general population that develops airborne or
ground-based systems containing software (DO-178B compliant software in particular). Collecting data
from the entire population was clearly infeasible. Hence, data from a subset of the general population
was needed. To make valid statistical inferences from data collected from a subset of the population, the
data must come from individuals that together form a reasonable representation of the population of
airborne and ground-based software developers that must comply with DO-178B.
Surveys provide a relatively inexpensive, yet effective means for getting information from a large,
geographically dispersed population. Although some doubt the reliability of data derived from a
relatively small number of respondents, sample survey methods have gained wide acceptance for their
accuracy in producing standardized data amenable to quantification and statistical analysis. Surveys are
also cost effective because they impose only limited time constraints on respondents and do not require
time and travel resources to attend meetings. Additionally, surveys can ensure anonymity and
confidentiality (which is important when commenting on a regulatory authority such as the FAA).
Based on these considerations, the technical team conducted an industry-wide survey. The survey was
designed to determine overall satisfaction in the aviation industry with the FAA's software approval
process, and determine the extent and significance of the problem areas identified at the workshops. The
technical team sought the expertise of the Center for Survey Research (CSR) at the University of Virginia
to assist in the survey process. The four elements in this process were identification of the sample
population, development of the survey instrument, administration of the survey, and data analysis.
1.3.1 Identification of Sample Population
To make generalizations and statistical inferences about the software aviation community, the sample
population must be a reasonable representation of the community. The following attributes were
determined to be important for ensuring that the SSAC survey population constituted a reasonable
representation:
• different levels of experience with DO-178B;
• different roles in the development and approval process for software;
• experience with a variety of airborne systems products installed on a variety of different aircraft
and engine types;
• experience with a variety of ground-based systems products;* and,
• experience with projects of various size and criticality.
Statisticians prefer to choose a sample population by random selection methods; however, there are no
public listings of individuals involved in the development and approval of software in compliance with
DO-178B. Thus, random methods could not be applied in this case. Consequently, the sample
population was identified on a company basis to attempt to ensure a representative sample and to ensure
that company management was aware of the effort. Because much of the survey content concerns FAA-
specific issues, participation was limited to companies within the United States.
The technical team distributed survey information to companies with experience developing DO-178B
compliant software. These companies were identified through attendance lists from SSAC workshops,
RTCA membership lists, and lists provided by FAA offices.
Because the survey issues were specific to DO-178B, the minimum criteria for survey participation
was experience with DO-178B in at least one of the following roles:
• software engineer with direct development responsibility in software design, testing, or quality
assurance;
• software engineering project manager responsible for directing software professionals;
• system project manager responsible for the overall cost and schedule including software; or,
• certification liaison, including company or consultant DER, responsible for coordination with the
ACO or other approving authority.
Each company interested in participating in the survey identified a point-of-contact to register
qualified individuals within the company to receive the survey and to coordinate distribution of the
survey. Because company size and product lines vary throughout the industry, no limits were placed on
the number of individuals in each company that could register. A total of 416 individuals (representing
more than 70 companies) registered for the survey through this process.
1.3.2 Survey Instrument and Implementation
The technical team defined the questions to be included in the survey instrument. The final survey
questionnaire is given in Appendix A. For the most part, the questions came directly from the issues
raised at Workshops I and II. The survey questions divided into the 15 topics shown in Table 1.
To improve the quality of the survey, a number of steps were taken prior to producing the
questionnaire. The survey questions were reviewed by CSR to help remove bias in the way questions
were stated and ensure that the response options were independent and complete. FAA representatives
reviewed the questions to ensure that their concerns were addressed. Finally, the technical team
Although the approval processes for ground-based and airborne systems differ substantially, software aspects of
approval, in particular development in compliance with DO-178B, are similar.
conducted two pretests with small subsets of the population. The pretest participants provided feedback
on the questionnaire's clarity and comprehensiveness.
Table 1. Organization and Content of the SSAC Survey Questionnaire
Survey Section
A&B
Topic
Respondent Background and Experience
FAA Policy, Guidance, and Audits
D Aircraft Certification Offices
GD Approving Authorities for Ground-based Systems
E Independence
F Modified Condition Decision Coverage
G Traceability
H Quality Assurance
I Documentation
J Tool Qualification
K
L
GL
M
Safety
Designated Engineering Representatives
Using Designated Engineering Representatives for Ground-based Systems
Availability of Information about the Certification Process
P Appropriateness of DO-178B for Ground-based Systems
Changes identified during reviews and pretests were made before the final survey questionnaire was
produced. The questionnaire was then coded on a floppy disk using a Computer Assisted Self-
administered Interviewing (CASI) format. CSR administered the survey, including survey distribution
and follow-up reminders, over a 10-week period from mid-December 1998 through mid-February 1999.
To help allay fears about commenting on an approving authority, CSR collected all of the responses and
filtered identifiers, such as name and company affiliation, before delivering the survey responses to the
technical team. During the collection period, CSR received 300 questionnaires, for a response rate of
approximately 72%. Of those 300 questionnaires, 292 were completed surveys suitable for analysis.
2. Survey Results
The presentation of the survey results follows the outline of the survey. Except for the respondent
profile, each section begins with an overview of the background and objectives for that section, followed
by the significant findings and technical recommendations. While many of the specific recommendations
are intended for the FAA, some recommendations are intended for the RTCA Special Committee 190 on
Software Application Guidelines for RTCA DO-178B/ED-12b or for the industry in general.
Relevant survey questions are identified in brackets throughout the discussion. The reader may
consult Appendix A to find the text of each question. Specific survey responses are italicized. Unless
otherwise noted, all of the survey respondents answered the questions in each survey section.
2.1 Sections A and B: Profile of Survey Respondents
Sections A and B of the survey questionnaire yielded a profile of each survey respondent, from which
could be established whether the sample population was representative of the aviation software
community as a whole. As mentioned previously, the survey specifically targeted engineers and
managers, airborne and ground-based systems developers, and manufacturers and product suppliers, all
with a range of experience with DO-178B.
Because the approval process is different in some aspects for airborne and ground-based systems,
certain sections of the survey targeted issues related only to airborne systems and others targeted issues
for ground-based systems. Accordingly, the sample population was divided into airborne and ground-
based respondents. Of the respondents representing the 292 completed surveys used in this preliminary
analysis, 206 were considered airborne respondents and 86 were considered ground-based respondents
[A4, A5]. For the purposes of this survey, respondents with both airbome and ground-based experience
within the past 5 years were considered as ground-based respondents. A majority of ground-based
respondents also had experience with airborne systems within the past 5 years.
2.1.1 Respondent Experience
In general, the survey indicated that the respondents had considerable experience in aviation software.
Over 65% of the respondents cited 10 or more years of experience in aviation software [A1]. Over 58%
of the respondents had been with their current employer at least 10 years [A2]. Only 15 respondents had
less than 2 years of experience in aviation software.
Many of the respondents had multiple roles in the development and approval of software. Just over
75% of the respondents cited extensive software engineering experience within the past five years [A3a].
Most of the respondents also had experience with some level of software management responsibility as a
software engineering lead or project manager. Almost 72% of the respondents had at least some project
management experience [A3c]. Of the 292 respondents, 194 had at least some certification liaison
experience [A3d]. Of those claiming certification liaison experience, more than half were not DERs, 56
were DERs, and 18 were candidate DERs [A3f]. Over 93% of the DERs were company DERs, and most
(about 75%) could approve Level A data [A3g].
Although most of the respondents had substantial experience in aviation software, most of the
respondents did not have experience on a large number of DO-178B projects. This was expected given
the relatively short time DO-178B has been in use. About 71% had completed five or fewer projects.
Almost 20% had not completed a DO-178B project yet [B7]. However, most of the respondents did have
experience developing software under standards other than DO-178B. Approximately 73% had personal
experience with DO-178A [B8a], about 45% had experience with military standards [B8d], and 27% had
experience with other standards [B8e]. Experience within software development teams was similar to the
personal experience.
About 84% of the respondents had at least some experience with Level A or B software [B10]. A
significant number of the respondents (about 72%) dealt with Level A or B at least regularly. The size of
the largest current software project ranged from less than 1000 non-commented source lines to over
350,000 non-commented source lines [B12]. The survey data did not provide a clear picture of the
amount of software developed for each software level.
2.1.2 Company Information
As expected based on the general population, most respondents (about 75%) worked for airborne
equipment suppliers [A6]. Of the remaining 25%, about 9% worked for aircraft manufacturers, 4%
worked for ground equipment suppliers, 4% worked for suppliers of both airborne and ground equipment,
and about 5% worked for engine manufacturers. Approximately 54% of the respondents indicated they
knew the Capability Maturity Model (CMM) rating for their company [B 16]. Of those, more than 90%
indicated their company was rated at Level 2 or higher. About 56% were at Level 2 and 18% at Level 3.
About 68% of those ratings were determined by external assessment [B 17].
The respondents had experience with a wide range of products for both airborne [B3] and ground-
based [B6] systems, as shown in Tables 2 and 3.
Table 2. Respondent Experience with Airborne Systems Products
Airborne product
Autopilot
Number of respondents with experience
45
Flight management computer 50
Engine control 46
Passenger entertainment 10
Displays 74
Navigation equipment 63
Flight controls 43
Anti-skid braking 12
Fuel systems 28
Electrical/power systems
Communication equipment
Audio systems
Traffic collision avoidance systems
24
48
16
10
Data acquisition 5
Weather-related systems 8
Monitoring & maintenance 11
Other 25
Table 3. Respondent Experience with Ground-based Systems Products
Ground-based systems product Number of respondents with experience
Communications 27
Navigation 41
Surveillance 12
Automation 16
12Air traffic management
Health and usage monitoring
Maintenance and test
Information/data management 4
Other 6
The airborne products were also associated with a variety of different aircraft and engine types [B4], as
shown in Table 4.
Table 4. Aircraft or Engine Type Associated with the Airborne Systems Product Lines
Aircraft or engine type
Transport aircraft
Number of respondents with experience
121
Regional aircraft 100
Business aircraft (Part 91) 119
General aviation aircraft 67
Rotorcraft 52
Large turbine engine 41
Small turbine engine 54
Piston engine 15
Military aircraft 3
Other 3
Thesizeof softwaredevelopmentteamsandthenumberandsizeof thesoftwareprojectsvaried
significantlyoverthesamplepopulation,asexpectedgiventhediversitythroughouttheaviationsoftware
industry.Most(68%)of therespondentsworkedonrelativelysmallsoftwaredevelopmentteamswith 15
or fewermembers[B2]. Lessthan9%of therespondentsworkedon largeteamswithmorethan50
members.About46% of therespondentsworkedwith companiesthat hadfive or fewerDO-178B
projectsapprovedperyear[B13]. Morethan50%of therespondentsreceivedTSOauthorizationsonat
least76%of theirprojects[B5].
Thefinalmeasureof whetherthesamplepopulationfor airbornerespondentswasrepresentativeof the
generalpopulationwas the geographic distribution of the respondents. All of the Certification
Directorates, and all but two of the ACOs in the United States (in Denver and Anchorage), were
represented by the survey respondents [B 14]. Most of the airborne respondents worked with the Small
Airplane or Transport Airplane Directorates. In about 85% of the cases, the primary ACO was the one
that covers the geographic region [B 14A]. In addition to their primary ACO, respondents indicated that
they interacted with other ACOs; frequently mentioned ACOs were Seattle, Wichita, Los Angeles, and
Atlanta. Table 5 shows the primary and secondary ACOs specified by the airborne respondents.
Table 5. Airborne Respondents' Primary and Secondary Aircraft Certification Directorates and Offices
Certification Directorate Number of respondents Number of respondents
Certification Office indicating primary ACO indicating secondary ACO
Transport Airplane Certification Directorate 77 98
Denver Aircraft Certification Office (ANM 100D) 0 1
Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ANM 100L) 48 42
Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ANM 100S) 29 55
Small Airplane Certification Directorate 83 99
Anchorage Aircraft Certification Office (ACE 115N) 0 2
Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office (ACE 115A) 8 37
Chicago Aircraft Certification Office (ACE 115C) 25 13
Wichita Aircraft Certification Office (ACE 115W) 50 47
Rotorcr@ Certification Directorate 4 17
Fort Worth Airplane Certification Office (ASW 150) 1 5
Fort Worth Rotorcraft Certification Office (ASW 170) 1 10
Fort Worth Special Certification Office (ASW 190) 2 2
Engine and Propeller Certification Directorate 32 28
Boston Aircraft Certification Office (ANE 150) 17 7
Engine Certification Office (ANE 140) 7 8
New York Aircraft Certification Office (ANE 170) 8 13
Brussels Aircraft Certification Division (AEU 100) 0 8
In developing this survey, the team expected that for most of the ground-based systems developed
using DO-178B, one of three primary approving authorities would be involved: (1) the Product Team for
the Global Positioning System (FAA AND-730); (2) the Product Team for Navigation and Landing (FAA
AND-740); or (3) the GPS, Navigation and Landing Branch (FAA AOS-240). Although many of the
ground-based respondents indicated that they worked with these three approving authorities, they also
cited experience working with several ACOs including Los Angeles, Seattle, Chicago, Engine
Certification, Wichita, Boston, and New York. Table 6 shows the distribution of approving authorities
for ground-based systems.
Table6. ApprovingAuthoritiesIndicatedbytheGround-basedRespondents
Approvingauthorityforground-basedquipment Numberofrespondentswith
experience
ProductTeamfortheGlobalPositioningSystem(AND-730) 17
ProductTeamforNavigationandLanding(AND-740) 17
28GPS,NavigationandLandingBranch(AOS-240)
LosAngelesAircraftCertificationOffice(ANM-100L)
SeattleAircraftCertificationOffice(ANM-100S) 3
EngineCertificationOffice(ANE-140) 3
ChicagoAircraftCertificationOffice(ACE-115C) 2
WichitaAircraftCertificationOffice(ACE-115W) 2
BostonAircraftCertificationOffice(ANE-150) 1
NewYorkAircraftCertificationOffice(ANE-170) 1
FortWorthSpecialCertificationOffice(ASW-190) 1
Other 3
Overall,therespondentprofileshowedthatthesurveyreacheda widecrosssectionof theaviation
softwarecommunity.Althoughtherearenodefinitivestatisticsonvariousattributesof thepopulationfor
comparison,theresponsesto theprofilequestionsprovidedsufficientevidencethatthesamplepopulation
wasafair representationf thegeneralpopulation.Thus,theteambelievesthatdrawinggeneralizations
fromthesurveyfindingsisreasonable.
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2.2 Section C: FAA Policy, Guidance, and Audits
A major area of concern raised by attendees of the two SSAC workshops was software policy and
guidance. This area has the potential for affecting costs significantly. Workshop attendees claimed that
policies are unclear and that FAA guidance in several technical areas is incomplete. This section of the
survey addressed the guidance received by the industry on technical and process issues concerned with
certification and with audit timing. Both airborne and ground-based respondents were asked to answer
the questions in this section.
The section was divided into four major parts:
(1) overall satisfaction with the certification process and with written software policy and guidance;
(2) specific issues pertaining to different aspects of DO-178B guidance;
(3) specific issues pertaining to "additional considerations" not explicitly related to DO-178B and
which require FAA policy and guidance; and,
(4) audit frequency and duration.
The following were the objectives for this section.
• Determine an overall level of satisfaction with software aspects of certification
• Determine if regulatory software reviews (on-site audits) impose undue burden without benefit
2.2.1 Significant Findings
The section began with a general question about overall satisfaction with the software approval
process [C1]. The survey responses for this question were encouraging: 70.4% of the respondents
selected a positive or neutral response (very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, or neither satisfied nor
dissatisfied). A purely positive interpretation of the responses to this question is, however, inconsistent
with the survey responses to the detailed questions in this section. Also, the fact that nearly 30% of the
respondents were either somewhat dissatisfied (23.6%) or very dissatisfied (6%)--indicates room for
improvement.
A detailed analysis of the responses to question C1 yielded additional insight but little change in the
conclusion. Analysis of the responses was performed to determine overall satisfaction of various groups
of respondents with the FANs software approval process as shown in Table 7.
Table 7. Satisfaction of Various Subgroups with the FAA Process for Software Aspects of Certification
Subgroups of the sample population Percentage of respondents either
somewhat or very dissatisfied
Experience of 1-5 certifications using DO-178B 26%
Experience of 6 or more certifications using DO-178B 31%
Regular experience with Level A or B software 28%
Most experience with Level A or B software 28%
Extensive project management experience 36%
Some project management experience
Extensive software engineering experience
Some software engineering experience
24%
27%
35%
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Thistableshowsthatdissatisfactionwith theFAAprocessfor softwareaspectsof certificationisnot
relatedto lackof experienceor training. Thus,theoveralldissatisfactionlevelcannotbe legitimately
dismissedforthisreason.
QuestionC2Aaskedhowsatisfiedrespondentswerein general(overall)withexisting,writtenFAA
softwarepolicyandguidance.Forthesurvey,"writtenpolicyandguidance"wasdefinedasincludingthe
FederalAviationRegulations(FARs),DO-178B,FAA Notices,FAA Orders,AdvisoryCirculars,and
FAA policy memos. Themajorityof respondentswereeithersomewhat satisfied (39.9%) or very
satisfied (2.4%). A total of 27.3% were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied. But very large fractions of the
respondents were somewhat dissatisfied (23.8%) or very dissatisfied (6.6%), justifying the conclusion that
the quality of written software guidance can be improved.
As with question C1, a detailed analysis of the responses to question C2A yielded insight but little
change in the conclusion. Analysis of the responses was performed to determine overall satisfaction of
various groups of respondents with software policy and guidance as shown in Table 8.
Table 8. Satisfaction of Various Subgroups with FAA Software Policy and Guidance
Subgroups of the sample population Percentage ofrespondents either
somewhat or very dissatisfied
Experience of 1-5 certifications using DO-178B
Experience of 6-20 certifications using DO-178B
31%
23%
Regular experience with Level A or B software 29%
Most experience with Level A or B software 33%
Extensive project management experience 40%
Some project management experience 28%
Extensive software engineering experience 25%
Some software engineering experience 47%
Again, this data confirmed the conclusion that the level of dissatisfaction was fairly high, and that this
was not a result of a lack of software engineering or DO-178B experience or training.
Sixteen questions asked about the adequacy of documented software policy in specific technical areas
[C2a-q]. A final question asked about areas not covered by the previous 16. The technical areas covered
were:
• planning [C2a];
• requirements [C2b];
• design [C2c];
• code [C2d];
• verification [C2e];
• configuration management [C2f];
• quality assurance [C2g];
• certification liaison [C2h];
• Commercial-Oft-The-Shelf (COTS) software [C2i];
• legacy software and software reuse [C2j];
• user-modifiable software [C21];
• partitioning [C2m],
• service history [C2n];
• tool qualification [C2o];
• classification of changes [C2p]; and,
• altemate means of compliance [C2q].
The responses to these questions were remarkably consistent and mostly negative. For questions C2a
through C2h about the software life cycle processes in DO-178B, the dominant response was barely
sufficient. When combining barely sufficient with the next category, insufficient, the percentage in these
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two categories was at least 85% in all cases. For questions C2i through C2q about additional
considerations, the dominant response was insufficient. In almost all cases, the percentage of respondents
claiming insufficient software policy in this category was more than 50%.
Thus, the survey results showed that the present written software guidance for some important
technical areas is inadequate.
Question C2r asked for comments about technical areas not addressed by other questions in this
section. A total of 50 comments were received. The topics covered many aspects of the certification
process, including the following:
(1) inconsistent interpretation of documentation about the certification process; and,
(2) lack of guidance, or unawareness on the part of the respondents that guidance is available, in a
number of areas (for example, reuse, structural coverage, and safety).
Survey questions C3 (for airbome respondents) and GC3 (for ground-based respondents) asked
whether the respondent had participated within the last five years in a software audit; subsequent
questions asked the respondent's view about timing and depth of these audits. Roughly 50% of the
respondents had participated in at least one audit.
Question C5 asked the respondent for an opinion about the appropriateness of the number of audits.
Almost 62% replied that the number of audits was about right. In-depth analysis of the responses to this
question revealed that the number of respondents who chose about right varied considerably with factors
such as software engineering experience, but in no case did it drop below 50%. Question C7 asked about
the duration of regulatory audits. Seventy-nine percent of the responses were about right.
Question C10 was about the depth of software audits. Roughly equal numbers of respondents thought
the depth of regulatory audits was about right (42.8%) or vary significantly (42.8%). The high percentage
of responses that cited significant variation in the depth of regulatory audits indicates this should be
further understood and addressed.
2.2.2 Summary and Recommendations
Based on the survey responses, the written software policy and guidance provided for the certification
process appears to be inadequate in both availability and quality. This is a serious situation that appears
to lead to major project delays and unnecessary expenditures by aerospace companies. Revising the
guidance documents and improving the process by which they are developed would help. With respect to
software audits, the timing appeared to be satisfactory for the most part. The most significant issue was
the variability of the depth of regulatory audits.
Recommendation CI: The FAA and the industry, in conjunction with RTCA, should determine the
appropriate means for providing information for all software life cycle processes. For example, the FAA
and the industry should determine what is needed to supplement and clarify DO-178B in the areas of
requirements, design, code, verification, planning, certification liaison, quality assurance, and
configuration management.
Recommendation C2: The FAA should lead the development of policy and guidance for COTS
software, legacy software and software reuse, user-modifiable software, partitioning, tool qualification,
service history, major and minor software changes, alternate means of compliance, and emerging
technologies as they arise.
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RecommendationC3: TheFAA shoulddevelopanapproachto ensureconsistencyin the depthof
regulatoryauditsatthedifferentsoftwarelevels.
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2.3 SectionD: Aircraft Certification Offices
This section of the survey was designed to assess issues of inconsistencies and inadequacies specific to
approving authorities. Because airborne and ground-based respondents typically interact with different
approving authorities, questions for this topic were partitioned into two parts: Section D was devoted to
airborne respondents' experience with ACOs, and Section GD was devoted to ground-based respondents'
experience with their primary approving authorities.
Certification is not an easy task, requiring considerable cooperation and communication between
regulator and applicant. At Workshop I, participants expressed concerns regarding interactions with
ACOs and other approving authorities. Their concerns were generally in two areas, communication
(ranked as the sixth most important issue) and consistency (ranked as the most important issue).
The Task Force 4 report cites "poor quality or slow communication between authorities' offices and
particularly across organizational boundaries within an authority" (ref. Final, page 84). SSAC workshop
participants also thought that ACOs could improve the timeliness of feedback and coordination of
certification issues with national resources. Honoring agreements was also a primary concern. This
concern is echoed in the Task Force 4 finding that decision reversals may occur within the FAA without
adequate involvement of technical personnel (ref. Final, page 84).
On the consistency issue, concerns were expressed about inconsistencies that exist between ACOs
with regard to software policy, guidance, and the interpretation of DO-178B. These concerns prompted
allegations that applicants were moving from one ACO to another to shop for favorable circumstances. In
addition, workshop attendees thought ACO engineers within the same ACO treat some companies
differently. Regardless of the source of the inconsistency, workshop participants were vocal in their call
for a level playing field. Only those airborne respondents indicating they had experience interacting with
their primary ACO were prompted to answer the questions in this section.
The following were the objectives for this section.
• Determine level of satisfaction with services provided by ACOs
• Determine if there have been instances of inconsistencies among or within ACOs and determine if
there have been more than a few isolated occurrences
• If there are frequent or substantial accounts of inconsistencies, determine if they impact cost or
schedule
• Determine what types of inconsistencies exist
2.3.1 Significant Findings
Of the 206 airborne respondents, 77 (38%) believed they had enough interaction with their primary
ACO to rate its performance [D1]. These 77 are the "section D respondents". Section D respondents had
a split opinion about the overall satisfaction with their primary ACO. Roughly, 54% were either
somewhat satisfied or very satisfied with their primary ACO, while 26% were somewhat or very
dissatisfied [D2]. The remaining questions in this section addressed the communication and consistency
issues in detail.
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2.3.1.1 Communication
Survey respondents were queried about specific communication and coordination activities related to
software. Most respondents indicated broad satisfaction (defined as 60% or more reporting good, very
good, or excellent experiences with the FAA) with their primary ACO's ability to return phone calls
[D3a], respond to written communication [D3b], address certification issues [D3c], and coordinate
meetings and reviews [D3e]. Areas of most concern were establishing and honoring dates for reviews
and approvals [D3d], with 20% rating their primary ACO as poor; coordination with technical resources
[D3g], with a 17% poor rating; and, response to submitted plans [D3h], with a 22% poor rating.
Honoring verbal and written agreements was of particular concern to workshop participants. Survey
respondents indicated that ACOs reneged on both verbal and written agreements. Exactly 50% indicated
that verbal agreements had not been honored [D25], and 20% indicated that written agreements had not
been honored [D26]. The explanation cited most frequently was FAA personnel changed [D27]. This in
itself suggests that ACO engineers looking at the same data often do not make the same decisions.
2.3.1.2 Consistency
The survey results indicated that inconsistencies exist within and among ACOs. Of the section D
respondents, 52 of them (about 67%) worked with more than one ACO [D7]. Of these 52 respondents, 39
of them (76.5%) said they received inconsistent software guidance, interpretations, or procedural
requirements from different ACOs within the past three years [D9], with 61% incurring major additional
costs as a result [D13a]. Of the 39 respondents experiencing inconsistencies, less then 13% claimed they
happened rarely [D12], and almost 53% indicated that the inconsistency was fundamentally different
[D13]. According to the survey, the differences with greatest consequence were about issue papers and
interpretation of DO-178B [D10b]. The survey responses indicated that inconsistencies and
communication issues with ACOs did not result in applicants shopping for more favorable certification
circumstances. The major reason cited for using multiple certification offices was customer's geographic
region [D8].
Of the 77 section D respondents, 36% received inconsistent software guidance within the same ACO
[D20]. Although the number of respondents indicating such experience was relatively small (26), the
survey results showed that when these inconsistencies occurred, they were not isolated incidents. Of the
26 respondents that experienced inconsistency from within the same ACO, most of them experienced
such at least occasionally or frequently [D22] and incurred major additional costs as a result [D23]. As in
the case of inconsistency among different ACOs, inconsistent interpretation of DO-178B was the single
most frequently cited problem [D24].
Giving respondents the opportunity to comment about their primary ACO provided insights. Many
claimed that their ACO is understaffed, the workload is too high, and the ACO engineers have
insufficient background in software [D4]. This supports the Task Force 4 finding that FAA employees
are "currently being spread too thin" (ref. Final, page 84). With respect to consistency, one respondent
suggested that "inconsistencies lead to reduced levels of safety, with the least safe systems and equipment
being the most competitive due to reduced regulatory overhead." Another stated "the main problem is a
lack of a level playing field between ACOs." Other comments stated that differences exist among the
National Resource Specialist (NRS), ACOs, Certification Directorate, and FAA Headquarters.
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2.3.2 Summary and Recommendations
The survey results revealed problems in communication between ACOs and applicants and
inconsistency in interpretation of software policy and guidance, especially inconsistent interpretation of
DO-178B. Although the number of respondents experiencing inconsistencies among and within ACOs
was not large, inconsistencies did occur and imposed major additional costs.
Recommendation DI: The FAA should identify the minimum software capability needed within the
agency to efficiently and effectively communicate and coordinate with applicants, and implement
appropriate hiring, policy, and training as needed.
Recommendation D2: The FAA should examine the circumstances leading to nullification of verbal and
written agreements.
Recommendation D3: The FAA and applicants should document agreements up front. The FAA should
develop and implement processes and supporting policy for managing agreements.
Recommendation D4: The FAA should investigate the root cause(s) of inconsistencies in software
guidance, interpretation, and procedural requirements among and within ACOs.
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2.4 Section GD: Approving Authorities for Ground-based Systems
This survey section examined industry's perceptions of the FAA offices with responsibility for
approving ground-based equipment containing software. In particular, AND-730 for the Local Area
Augmentation System and the Wide Area Augmentation System, AND-740 for Instrument Landing
Systems and the Transponder Landing System, and AOS-240 for Special Category I ground stations
formed most of this group. Any ACO involvement with this segment of the industry was excluded from
the discussion in this section. Only ground-based respondents were prompted to answer the questions in
this section.
In accord with Section D, the following were the objectives for this section.
• Determine level of satisfaction with services provided by approving authorities for ground-based
systems
• Determine if there are inconsistencies among approving authorities and, if so, determine if these
inconsistencies are common
• If there are frequent or substantial accounts of inconsistencies, determine if they affect cost or
schedule
Determine what types of inconsistencies exist
2.4.1 Significant Findings
Only a small subset of the sample population answered the questions in this section. Although 86
survey respondents identified themselves as having ground-based experience, barely a quarter of those
(22 respondents) reported direct contact with the three FAA organizations of primary interest: AND-730,
AND-740, and AOS-240 [GD1]. These 22 are referred to as "section GD respondents". The small
number of the section GD respondents precludes extrapolation to a larger population; but many of the
trends shown in survey section D were also reflected here, which lends credibility to the results.
There was a noticeable split in the overall levels of satisfaction with the approving authorities for
ground-based equipment in this context: fairly heavy at each end of the satisfaction spectrum, with little
neutrality [GD3]. Almost 59% of the section GD respondents were either very or somewhat satisfied with
their approving authority, while almost 30% said they were very or somewhat dissatisfied. Less than 12%
said they were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied. The bulge seen at the dissatisfied end of the spectrum
has several possible explanations--mismatched expectations between applicants and regulators,
inexperience of either or both, and so on--and merits further examination.
2.4.1.1 Communication
Question GD4 was composed of several questions aimed at the overall satisfaction with the approval
authority, especially with respect to communication and coordination. Within this block of responses,
two patterns emerged. The first was one of broad satisfaction (60% or more of the section GD
respondents reporting good, very good, or excellent experiences with the FAA). This pattern was
associated with FAA responsiveness via telephone [GD4a], responsiveness to written communications
[GD4b], performance in addressing certification issues [GD4c], performance in establishing and honoring
calendar commitments [GD4d], and performance in coordinating meetings and reviews [GD4e]. The
remaining questions of this section--coordination with technical resources outside the approving
authority's immediate group [GD4g] and handling of submitted plans [GD4h]--revealed marginally
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greaterdissatisfaction,withfair and poor responses ranging from 35-50%. The same was noted in the
airborne section.
Regardless of the number of incidents, nullification of previously agreed positions can be disruptive
and expensive, and is taken seriously by both the FAA and applicants. Although the absolute numbers
were not large, ground-based respondents indicated incidents where verbal and written agreements had
not been honored. Ten of the section GD respondents indicated that verbal agreements with ground-
based authorities had been nullified [GD21], and five said that written agreements had been nullified
[GD22]. The survey responses revealed a pattern of similarities between air and ground in the reasons for
nullification of agreements. The three leading reasons given by respondents for these annulments were
FAA rules changed, FAA personnel changed, and the original FAA parties to the agreement rescinded it
[GD 23].
When survey participants were asked to provide commentary on their experience working with AND-
730, AND-740 and AOS-240 [GD5], the responses also fell broadly into opposite ends of the spectrum.
Some respondents indicated dismay with perceptions of unclear expectations by the FAA, lack of
appropriate policy instruments, a "checklist" approach to approvals, and excessive workload imposed on
FAA personnel. Conversely, a few respondents were equally clear in their praise for FAA
professionalism and helpfulness. Results were thus mixed, but these responses were somewhat less
positive than one might expect from the levels of satisfaction seen earlier.
2.4.1.2 Consistency
To find respondents most qualified to judge inconsistencies among different FAA organizations,
Question GD6 asked if the respondent had worked with both AOS-240 and either of the AND groups.
Only three respondents answered yes to this question. Of those three, each worked with both
organizations out of necessity [GD7]. Possibly of greater significance, despite the tiny sample size, was
that all three reported inconsistencies in guidance, interpretation or procedural requirements from the
FAA organizations involved [GD8].
2.4.2 Summary and Recommendations
For the ground-based respondents, problems in communication were more evident than problems with
consistency, likely due to the small subset responding to this section. The following recommendations
address the communication issue.
Recommendation GDI: The FAA should examine the circumstances leading to nullification of verbal
and written agreements.
Recommendation GD2: The FAA and suppliers should document agreements up front. The FAA
should develop and implement processes and supporting policy for managing agreements.
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2.5 SectionE: Independence
DO-178B requires that some activities be performed "with independence"; that is, that there is some
separation of responsibilities which ensures that specific objectives in Annex A of DO-178B are
accomplished. According to DO-178B, independence for a verification activity means that the
verification of an artifact is done by a different person than the one who developed the artifact itself. At
Workshop I, some participants expressed concerns about the contribution of the independence
requirements to safety and product quality. Some participants were also unclear about the meaning of the
term "independence". Both airborne and ground-based respondents were prompted to answer the
questions in this section.
The following were the objectives for this section.
• Determine level of understanding of the independence requirements
• Determine if the requirements for independence provide a tangible benefit
2.5.1 Significant Findings
To determine whether the respondents understood the definition of independence correctly, question
E1 asked if independence requires verification by a different person or by a different organization. About
86% of those who answered the question knew that independence only required a different person, not a
different organization. There was no statistical correlation between understanding the definition of
independence and either level of experience with DO-178B or software engineering experience.
Respondents were asked their opinions about overall satisfaction with the independence requirements
[E2]. In general, satisfaction was high, with 63% reporting to be either somewhat or very satisfied with
the independence requirements and 28% neither satisfied nor dissatisfied. Only 8.5% reported that they
were somewhat dissatisfied with the independence requirements, and only one person (out of 272 people
who responded to this question) was very dissatisfied.
Of the respondents who answered the question about the value of independence [E8], 82% thought
that it was extremely valuable (26%) or somewhat valuable (56%). Only 13% thought that independence
was of marginal value, and only 1.8% (5 out of 280) thought it was of no value. There was no correlation
between level of experience with DO-178B and belief about the value of the independence requirements.
The respondents with the most involvement with Level A or Level B software were most likely to answer
that the independence requirements were extremely or somewhat valuable.
Respondents were also asked how much time and cost their company would devote to independence if
it were not required by DO-178B [E7]. More than one half of the respondents (58.5%) said that they
would devote the same or almost as much as non', while 27% said that they would devote substantially
less than non', and 3% said they would devote no effort to independence if it were not required.
A requirement may be considered valuable, but it also may be very costly. Questions E5 and E6 were
asked to determine the cost differential between meeting a DO-178B requirement and meeting that
requirement with independence. Of those able to estimate the costs of independence, 43.5% indicated
that the software development costs attributed to independence were negligible or small, 47% that the
costs were substantial, and only 1% that the costs were nearly prohibitive. Similarly, 44% stated that the
software development time attributed to independence was negligible or small, 48% thought it was
substantial, and only one person (out of 270 respondents to this question) thought it was nearly
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prohibitive. The individual who reported nearly prohibitive costs and time reported only rare
involvement with Level A or Level B software. The survey results showed that the costs attributed to
independence decreased as experience with DO-178B increased.
In trying to ascertain which independence requirements might be most bothersome, respondents were
asked to indicate which requirements they did not like [E3]. These comments further demonstrated some
respondents' confusion about the meaning of independence.
2.5.2 Summary and Recommendations
Most survey respondents understood the correct definition of independence and were satisfied with the
requirements. Based on these results, the independence objectives in DO-178B should not be changed.
However, clarification of the meaning of independence and the purpose of the requirements might be
helpful.
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2.6 SectionF: Modified Condition DecisionCoverage
DO-178Brequiresmodifiedconditiondecisioncoverage(MCDC) for Level A software. This
requirementhasbeencontroversial,withmanypeoplepubliclyclaimingthatMCDCneverorrarelyfinds
errors;and,if it doesfind errors,thoseerrorsarenot safety-related.Others,however,look at the
requirementfor MCDCasanassurancemechanismto checktheadequacyof requirements-basedt sting.
Fromeitherperspective,thecostof achievingMCDChasbeenanissue.BecauseMCDCisonlyrequired
forLevelA software,onlythoserespondentswithLevelA experiencewereaskedtoanswerthequestions
in thissection.
Thefollowingweretheobjectivesfor thissection.
• DeterminewhetherpeopleunderstandMCDCandwhetherit isdonecorrectlywhenrequired
• Determineif thecostbenefittradeisworthwhilein goingtoMCDCcoverage
• Determineif MCDCistheappropriatestoppingcriteriafor LevelA testing
2.6.1 Significant Findings
A number of questions were asked to determine opinion about the difficulty of performing MCDC and
about how MCDC was being performed. About 60% of the survey respondents indicated they had
experience with Level A software [F0]. These respondents are referred to as "section F respondents".
These respondents clearly believed that MCDC was difficult. When asked about the difficulty of meeting
the MCDC objective [F1], 2% (three people out of 146 answering this question) thought it was trivially
simple, 19% thought it was moderately simple, 55.5% thought that it was moderately difficult, and 23%
thought that it was extremely difficult.
In general, the section F respondents took a number of different approaches to MCDC. About 59%
indicated that they did requirements-based testing and used the results to determine if additional
structural testing is necessary, 32.5% said they did structural coverage independent of requirements-
based testing, while others said that they did the two types of testing in parallel to save time or because
automated tools do not support a single test suite. About 74% of the respondents performed MCDC on
source code [F2]; 47% performed it on object code [F3]. Thirteen respondents claimed to not perform
MCDC on either the source or object code. Given that the section F respondents were all supposed to
have been directly involved in the development or approval of Level A software, the number who had not
performed MCDC should have been zero.
Conceming effectiveness [F4], 12% said they never found errors using MCDC, 59% said they rarely
did, 25% said they occasionally did, and 4% said they frequently did. Some of the notes provided by the
respondents to this question were interesting. One said that they were surprised to find branches in the
object code that they were not expecting; they thought they would not have found them doing coverage at
the source code level. Another thought that knowing they had to meet the MCDC objective had a
significant, positive influence on the design--"starting to think about structural coverage at verification
time has little benefit." Another noted that the errors that had been found during MCDC testing were
generally not the errors that MCDC testing was intended to find. A couple of respondents thought that
errors found with MCDC would be found by other types of structural testing. Finally, one person noted
that the errors found by MCDC were rare but they were the hardest ones to find.
Of the 116 people who responded that they rarely, occasionally, or frequently found errors while
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performingMCDC,21of themsaidtheyhadfoundsafety-criticalerrors.Seventy-sevenrespondentssaid
thattheyhadnot foundsafety-relatederrors,and18eitherdid notknowor declinedto answer[F4B].
Althoughit wasnotclearwhetherthe21peoplecorrespondedtoatleast21uniquediscoveriesof safety-
criticalerrors,thisresultdiffersfromthecommonindustryperceptionthatMCDCdoesnot findsafety-
criticalerrors.
Doinga tracefrom sourceto objectcodeaspartof MCDCwasalsoaddressed.Of thesectionF
respondents,57%saidtheydid traceabilityfromsourceto objectcode[F5]. Of thosewhodid,75%said
additionalverificationresultedfromsourceto objecttracing[F6]. In caseswhereadditionalverification
resulted,41%respondedthattheverificationfoundadditionalerrors[F7],and50%of thosesaidthey
foundsafety-relatederrors[F7a].
Manyof thecomplaintsabouttheMCDCrequirementconcernperceivedcostissues.Thesurvey
posedseveralquestionsto obtainMCDC-relatedcostinformation.Whenaskedto ratecostattributedto
performingMCDC,1%saidit wasnegligible, 16% said it was small, 67.5% said it was substantial, and
7% said it was nearly prohibitive [F9a]. Several noted cost reductions once they started to use supporting
tools. The time attributed to performing MCDC resulted in similar percentages [F9b]. The question
about which aspects of the MCDC objective are the most difficult [Flb] elicited a large number of
comments asserting the need for inexpensive tools to assist with the process.
The survey also asked the respondents to rate the value of MCDC for Level A systems [F9d]. The
survey results showed mixed opinions: 7.5% said it was extremely valuable, 40% said it was somewhat
valuable, 40% said that it was of marginal value, and 10% said it was of no value. Respondents were also
asked how much software development time and cost their company would devote to performing MCDC
if they were not required to meet the objective of DO-178B [F9c]. Approximately 5% said same as non',
19% said almost as much as non', 61% said substantially less than non', and 10% said none. Given the
frequent complaints about MCDC expressed by many members of the industry, it was interesting that half
of the respondents stated it was somewhat or extremely valuable, and nearly a quarter of the respondents
said they would do the same or almost as much as now even if they were not required to do so by DO-
178B.
2.6.2 Summary and Recommendations
In summary, the survey provided evidence that MCDC finds errors, even safety-critical errors. At the
same time, MCDC was perceived as difficult and expensive. A possible follow-up investigation would be
to determine whether those who are finding errors using MCDC differ significantly in the way they
perform it from those who do not find errors. Follow-up investigation also could be performed to
determine if some of the time and resources devoted to MCDC are wasted or applied inefficiently.
Recommendation FI: The FAA and the industry, in conjunction with the RTCA, should document the
intent of the MCDC objective and means for achieving MCDC. In addition, a tutorial should be
developed for performing and evaluating MCDC.
Recommendation F2: The FAA should initiate research to explore cost effective means of achieving
MCDC or its intent.
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2.7 SectionG: Traceability
Traceabilityrefersto thepracticeof trackingor tracingrequirementshroughthedevelopmentand
verificationprocess.Therearemanyreasonsfor traceability,includingrequirementscoverage,regression
analysis,andchangeimpactanalysis.DuringWorkshopI, participantsexpressedconcernabouthecost
of traceability,confusionovertheamountof traceabilityrequiredfor differentapplications,andwhat
techniquesandevidenceof traceabilitywereacceptableto theFAA. Bothairborneandground-based
respondentsansweredthequestionsin thissection.
Thefollowingweretheobjectivesforthissection.
• Determinethelevelofunderstandingof traceability
• Determinethecostof therequirementsfortraceability
• Determinetheperceivedvalueof traceability
2.7.1 Significant Findings
Respondents were asked a series of questions to determine their practices regarding traceability. The
survey results provided strong evidence that traceability was used effectively in most cases. Nearly all of
the respondents (99%) used traceability for requirements coverage [G1], 91% used it for regression
analysis [G3], and 81% used it for change impact analysis [G5]. When asked if traceability was done
only for certification, 77% of respondents responded no and 23% responded yes [G7]. At first glance, a
response rate of 23% indicating they did traceability only for certification may seem disturbing.
However, of that 23%, only 2 respondents did not use traceability for requirements coverage, regression
analysis, or change impact analysis.
Some misunderstandings about traceability from source to object code were evident in the survey
responses. Approximately 27% of the respondents indicated that they documented traceability from
source to object code [G11], regardless of whether they were developing Level A software. Of the 186
respondents who did not document traceability from source to object code, 26% of them indicated that
they always worked on Level A or B software. Responses to the follow-up question [G12] asking for the
reason traceability from source to object code was documented, were quite mixed. Respondents indicated
company procedures, ACO requirements, DER requirements, DO-178B requirements, and customer
requirements as reasons.
A majority of respondents (55%) said the cost [G13] and time [G14] for traceability was substantial.
But almost 66% of the respondents said they would do the same or almost as much as they currently do
without the DO-178B requirement [G15]. A full 87% of the respondents indicated that they believed DO-
178B's requirements for traceability were somewhat or extremely valuable. Based on these results, the
benefit of traceability appears to be clear.
2.7.2 Summary and Recommendations
In general, traceability is used effectively and is well understood. However, there appeared to be
significant misunderstandings with regard to requirements for establishing traceability from source to
object code.
Recommendation GI: The FAA and the industry, in conjunction with the RTCA, should clarify the
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intentof DO-178Bwith respecto sourceto objectcodecorrespondence.TheFAA shoulddevelop
policyto standardizetheapplicationof sourcecodetoobjectcodecorrespondence.
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2.8 SectionH: Quality Assurance
Three objectives for the software quality assurance (SQA) process in Annex A of DO-178B are as
follows.
SQA Objective 1: Assurance is obtained that software development and integral processes comply
with approved software plans and standards
SQA Objective 2: Assurance is obtained that transition criteria for the software life cycle processes
are satisfied
SQA Objective 3: Software conformity review is conducted
Participants at Workshop I questioned the effectiveness of these SQA objectives. In particular,
workshop participants expressed concern that an applicant could meet all of the SQA objectives without
producing a quality product. This section of the survey was designed to solicit opinion about the value of
the SQA objectives, and determine if certification cost could be reduced by lessening quality assurance
requirements in DO-178B. Attention was focused on the value of each of the three SQA objectives, and
on the cost and time of compliance. Both airborne and ground-based respondents answered the questions
in this section.
The following were the objectives for this section.
• Determine whether quality assurance as defined in DO-178B is perceived to be useful
• Determine the cost of compliance
2.8.1 Significant Findings
Respondents provided their opinions on the value of each of the three SQA objectives. The survey
results showed strong support for quality assurance as it exists in DO-178B as a whole. Approximately
79% of the respondents rated SQA objective 1 as extremely or somewhat valuable [H1]. One person
commented "Plans and standards are just paper unless they are followed. Without some tool for
providing assurance that they were applied they are meaningless.., experience has shown that the
apparent gains of not doing so are extremely short-term gains and do not offset the long term costs
associated with not having them."
A smaller majority of respondents (57%) stated that SQA objective 2 for transition criteria was
extremely or somewhat valuable. Only 12% claimed objective 2 was of no value [H2]. Similarly, SQA
objective 3 for software conformity review was also considered valuable. Over 72% of the respondents
rated it extremely or somewhat valuable and only 4.5% rated it of no value [H3].
Both the cost and time attributed to complying with the SQA objectives appeared reasonable: 58% of
the respondents considered them to be small or negligible. At the other extreme, almost 32% stated the
cost attributed to quality assurance was substantial [H4]. An in-depth analysis of the survey results
revealed a statistically significant correlation between cost of quality assurance and volume of DO-178B
projects. Respondents from companies that had a high number of approvals attributed less cost to quality
assurance than respondents from companies with a small number of approvals. One explanation is that
the resources and infrastructure, and therefore the cost, required for quality assurance was spread over
several projects. The fact that almost 73% of the respondents would do the same as now or almost as
much in the area of quality assurance if it were not required by DO-178B further indicated the importance
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of qualityassurance[H6].
2.8.2 Summary and Recommendations
The survey results showed strong support for quality assurance as it exists in DO-178B. It was not
clear whether the requirements could be reduced to save cost without sacrificing quality or safety.
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2.9 SectionI: Documentation
DO-178B states that the minimum software life cycle data to be submitted to the certification authority
for software approval is the Plan for Software Aspects of Certification (PSAC), the Software
Configuration Index, and the Software Accomplishment Summary. In addition, DO-178B states that
applicants should make available other data or evidence of compliance as requested by the certification
authority. Section 11 of DO-178B discusses the characteristics, form, and content of the software life
cycle data.
Workshop I revealed a widespread belief that ACOs routinely demand software-related documentation
that cannot be justified by DO-178B or the FARs, and that requirements for packaging documentation are
unreasonable. There was also a strong presumption that requirements for documentation could be
deleted, with no adverse effect on safety. Both airborne and ground-based respondents were prompted to
answer the questions in this section.
The following were the objectives for this section.
• Determine if any of the requirements for documentation result in unnecessary rework or write-only
documents
• Determine the cost of unnecessary documentation
2.9.1 Significant Findings
Survey respondents were asked questions to address both the packaging and content of documentation.
When asked how closely they follow the document outlines given in Section 11 of DO-178B,
approximately 73% of the respondents indicated strict or close adherence with some exceptions [I1]. The
format of data prepared by applicants was generally driven by company procedures, with only 23% of
format requirements dictated by ACOs or DERs [I2]. No responses to this question suggested a problem
with the formats described in Section 11. Indeed, most replies indicated that the guidance in DO-178B
was useful rather than a hindrance, citing consistency and ease of comprehension for purposes of review
and audit.
To further explore the packaging issue, respondents were asked if they had experienced a rejection
based on format of certification data within the last five years [I3]. Only 16% of the valid responses were
yes. Reasons for rejection differed little from those found elsewhere: confusion between regulatory and
contractual considerations, personal preferences of ACOs and DERs, and disagreements over
interpretations [I5]. Supplemental notes to this question pointed to rejection of electronic data in favor of
paper copies of documents. One note asserted that personnel changes at the ACO invariably resulted in
renegotiations of acceptable formats, and that these personnel changes were relatively frequent.
In addition to concerns about packaging, significant misunderstanding among applicants of what is
and is not required in the submittal of certification data was evident. When asked for examples of data
requested by ACOs beyond the requirements of DO-178B or the FARs [I6], few of the responses were
clearly beyond such requirements. More than half of the examples given were within an ACO's
legitimate purview under current roles [I7]. Such examples included coding standards, configuration
index data, and status of problem reports. Of the remaining data, most was tied to contractual or foreign-
authority considerations (and was thus beyond the scope of this survey) or had insufficient detail to allow
a judgment as to the merits of its claims. It was clear that much misunderstanding and misinformation
existed in the recording, retention, and submittal of certification data. Given the misunderstandings about
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whatconstitutedunreasonabler questsfor data,it wasdifficult to interpretresponsesaboutassociated
costs[I8].
Thesurveyaddressedunnecessaryor unreasonabler quirementsfor reworkfrom severaldifferent
perspectives.Respondentswereaskedif theFAAhadeverrequestedataor documentationthatwasnot
specifiedin the applicant'sPSAC[I8A]. The71%of therespondentswho saidno suggested that
applicants and regulators shared common expectations of each other in the majority of projects. On the
other hand, 55% of the respondents said they were required to update documentation at or near the end of
a project where the document revisions had no effect on the safety or maintenance of the product [I9]. In
most (61%) of these instances, approval was delayed due to these updates. In this case, the implication
was that such rework was of little or no value, and caused unnecessary delays in approval. An interesting
question not addressed by the survey is whether the requirements in DO-178B for updates are clear.
In a similar vein, there were assertions of documentation solely to meet certification requirements.
Question I15 asked if data (excluding the PSAC, Configuration Index, and Accomplishment Summary)
was produced solely to meet certification requirements and not used as part of the software development
process. Fully 40% of the respondents believed that they produced at least some such data. Although it is
reasonable to assume that producing data "for show" causes unnecessary costs, the survey uncovered few
useful clues to provide further insight [I16]. Most of the respondents listed data deliverables with no
explanation as to why the data was thought to be useless, and most of the more elaborate responses
suggested a misunderstanding of regulatory requirements.
Finally, questions in this section gauged whether people believed the data requirements of DO-178B
to be excessive, for both new and derivative equipment [II1-14]. In both cases, two-thirds of the
respondents said that the standard's requirements were not excessive. The responses of the one-third who
said the requirements were excessive provided no basis for constructive action.
2.9.2 Summary and Recommendations
There was significant misunderstanding among applicants of what is and is not required in the
submittal of certification data. In addition, there was evidence to suggest that the FAA has made
seemingly unnecessary requests for updates of data at the end of projects and requests for data that is not
used by applicants.
Recommendation II: The FAA should make compliance requirements explicit in the correct usage of
DO-178B's Section 11 guidelines.
Recommendation I2: The FAA should make compliance requirements explicit regarding the data
required for certification.
Recommendation I3: The FAA should investigate the reason for end-of-project updates to software data
or documentation that had no impact on the approval or continued safety or maintenance of the product.
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2.10 SectionJ: Tool Qualification
The concept of tool qualification is unique to civilian aviation. Other industries do not typically
require tool qualification prior to use. Qualification guidance in DO-178B is based on whether the tool is
a development tool or a verification tool. During Workshop I, participants raised concerns about the
benefit of tool qualification on the overall quality of the product. In particular, a few participants claimed
that tool qualification does not find errors. Some workshop participants also expressed concern about the
clarity of the qualification guidance in DO-178B and questioned why tools with known pedigrees require
qualification. Only those airborne and ground-based respondents with experience in tool qualification
were prompted to answer the questions in this section.
The following were the objectives for this section.
Determine whether tool qualification as required by DO-178B provides any benefit with respect to
product quality
Determine if the cost is justified by the benefit
2.10.1 Significant Findings
Approximately 52% of the survey respondents indicated they had experience with tool qualification
[J1]. These respondents are referred to as "section J respondents". The survey results clearly indicated
that errors had been found in tools during the qualification process. Of the section J respondents,
approximately 44% found errors with a development tool during tool qualification [J2]; 57% found an
error with a verification tool during tool qualification [J2A]. When asked their opinion about the
requirements for tool qualification, 59% of the respondents said the requirements for development tools
were about right, 9% said they were too weak, and 32% said they were too stringent [J3]. Similarly,
about 74% of the section J respondents said that the qualification requirements for verification tools were
either too weak or about right [J3AA].
Queries into cost showed that 60% of the respondents considered the cost attributed to tool
qualification to be small or negligible, 36% considered the cost to be substantial, and 4% considered the
cost to be prohibitive [J5]. Results for time attributed to tool qualification were comparable: 67% of the
respondents claimed time to be small or negligible, 30% claimed it to be substantial, and 3% claimed it to
be nearly prohibitive [J6]. Given that tool qualification has found errors and approximately two-thirds
indicated that cost and time were not substantial, one would expect that companies would continue to
qualify tools independent of the regulatory requirement.
There was, however, evidence that respondents believed that some of the resources expended for tool
qualification were unnecessary. When asked "how much development time and cost would your
company devote to tool qualification if you were not required to meet the objectives of DO-178B", many
of the respondents (over 63%) claimed substantially less than now or none [J7]. Also, 28% of the section
J respondents said that some tools should not require qualification, although they were required to do so
[J4]. When asked to explain why some tools should be exempt from qualification requirements, the
respondents' comments varied [J4A]. Several respondents advocated support for COTS tools or tools
with an industry-wide reputation being exempt from qualification. Other responses indicated possible
inconsistencies in the requirements for tool qualification.
Clearly a majority of the respondents believed that tool qualification was useful and the qualification
requirements were not excessive. One respondent wrote, "Software verification tool qualification is very
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easy.It includesthingsthatI wouldexpectanengineerto doanyway;knowthetoolrequirements,how
to testit, andactuallytestit." Othersechoedthisopinion. Considerable support (indicated by an 83%
positive response rate) existed for establishing a national repository for qualified tools [J3A]. People
raised logistical issues including purchasing, licensing, and repository control that should be addressed
before considering a national repository.
2.10.2 Summary and Recommendations
In summary, the survey results showed that the process of tool qualification provided a benefit.
Respondents considered it valuable, because tool qualification found errors, and the cost and time
appeared relatively small for a majority of the respondents. There may be benefit, however, in clarifying
the requirements for tool qualification for both industry and regulators so that requirements are applied
consistently, and in further investigating the concept of a national tool repository.
Recommendation Jl: The FAA should clarify compliance requirements and intent for tool qualification.
In addition, the FAA should clarify the definitions of development and verification tools.
Recommendation J2: The FAA and the industry should investigate techniques for tool qualification that
will allow qualification to be faster and cheaper. The FAA should determine the feasibility of a national
repository for qualified tools and acceptance criteria for the use of these tools.
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2.11 SectionK: Safety
Safety is an important issue to systems developers and the FAA. Participants in Workshop I were
vocal in their concerns about the relationship between DO-178B and safety. At Workshop II, participants
ranked the safety issue as the third most important issue for further investigation.
Beliefs differ about the connection between safety and DO-178B. Some argue safety issues are
adequately addressed through aspects of system development such as the Society of Automotive
Engineers (SAE) standards ARP-4754, Certification Considerations for Highly-Integrated or Complex
Aircraft Systems, and ARP-4761, Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process
on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment (refs. SAE ARP4754, SAE ARP4761). Others advocate
greater focus on safety in DO-178B. This section of the survey attempted to gather data on safety
information relevant to software development, safety-related errors, and derived requirements. Both
airborne and ground-based respondents were prompted to answer the questions in this section of the
survey.
The following were the objectives for this section.
• Determine whether people think that DO-178B adequately addresses the effect of software on the
safety of the overall system
• Determine safety-related activities used in addition to DO-178B
• Determine how derived requirements are addressed
2.11.1 Significant Findings
Several questions focused on industry's view of the adequacy and effectiveness of DO-178B for
software-related safety issues. When asked whether they believed DO-178B adequately addressed safety
issues, approximately 59% of the survey respondents indicated they believed it does, while 41% indicated
they believed it does not [K1].
Survey participants answered questions about additional safety activities performed beyond that
required by DO-178B. Nearly 49% of the respondents asserted that they performed additional activities
for software safety on quite a few, nearly all, or every project [K2]. More than half of the respondents
(56.5%) gave safety-related information, other than software level, to developers [K6]. Care must be
taken in interpreting these results, however. Answers to the question about the additional safety-related
activities they performed varied as to what activities were considered software related but outside of DO-
178B [K7]. Although many noted activities included in the system and safety guidelines, ARP-4754 and
ARP-4761, the survey still left unclear how much of systems information gathered during these activities
was used during the software development.
Of perhaps more use in providing information about the issue, 28% of those surveyed stated that they
worked on a system that had a software-related system error resulting in a service bulletin or
Airworthiness Directive [K3]. The software for those systems was DO-178B compliant. When asked
about the source of these errors [K4], 146 causes were noted: 69 were related to requirements, 32 to
design, and 35 to coding errors. This result was consistent with the ranking of requirements as an
important issue for research at Workshop II.
Question K5 asked those respondents who indicated they had not worked on a system with a software-
related system error their opinion about the contribution of DO-178B to the absence of errors. Somewhat
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surprisingly,only 37%claimedthatDO-178Bmadea major contribution to the absence of software-
related system errors; 63% claimed it made no contribution or a minor contribution to the absence of such
errors [K5]. This result may be interpreted as a comment either on the perceived ineffectiveness of DO-
178B with respect to system errors, or on the perceived unimportance of software on system errors.
A final objective of this section was to determine how industry treats derived requirements. Derived
requirements, according to DO-178B, are software design features that cannot be directly traced back to a
high-level software requirement. DO-178B requires derived requirements to be identified and subjected
to a system safety assessment. Only 9% of the respondents said that they did precisely this [K8]. Other
techniques for treating derived requirements included:
• create one or more "place-holder" requirements at a higher-level to which the derived
requirements can be traced (21%),
• add rationale to the documentation (16%),
• find existing and somewhat related requirements at a higher level to which the identified derived
requirements can be traced (40%), and
• do not identify derived requirements as such and treat them as an artifact of the design process
(14.5%).
Another 2% checked other and specified what they did. Most of these were either very similar to the
other choices given or reflected that the respondents did several of the other choices, or that the approach
varied by project.
Despite the fact that a large majority of respondents handle derived requirements in a manner
inconsistent with DO-178B, 22.6% of the total number of survey respondents stated that derived
requirements led to a safety-related modification to the system design [K9]. This result attests to the
importance of derived requirements with respect to safety.
2.11.2 Summary and Recommendations
Although the survey did not provide enough information to reach conclusions on the safety issue, the
results justify further research and information collection. The results also indicated that derived
requirements are not being handled as specified in DO-178B.
Recommendation KI: The FAA should study the relationship between DO-178B and safety and the
activities actually performed by the industry to ensure system safety.
Recommendation K2: The FAA should clarify compliance requirements and intent for derived
requirements.
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2.12 Section L: The DER System
This section of the survey was designed to address inconsistencies and inadequacies specific to the
DER system. This section was divided into two parts: Section L assessed satisfaction with and
effectiveness of DERs in the airborne world, and Section GL assessed the feasibility for delegation of
compliance-finding to DERs working on ground-based equipment.
The DER system is used to augment the federal work force. Under Title 14 Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR) Part 183, Representatives of the Administrator, the FAA is permitted to delegate some
findings of compliance to DERs. DERs provide the majority of data approvals for airborne products in
the United States each year. Hence, the effectiveness and efficiency of the DER system is significant to
the certification activities of most applicants and to the FAA.
At Workshop I, some participants claimed that the DER system does not work well for software
aspects of certification. Some thought that the FAA should delegate more authority to the software DERs
than they currently do, while others thought that the current qualification standards for DERs are
inadequate. A recent report from the Government Accounting Office (GAO) on aircraft certification also
highlighted delegation and qualification issues (ref. GAO). In addition to delegation issues, workshop
participants raised issues related to DER involvement with TSO projects. The TSO system now routinely
deals with complex computer-based systems. However, current policy does not give approval authority
to DERs on TSO projects. Only those airborne respondents with experience working with a software
DER were prompted to answer the questions in this section.
The following was the objective for this section.
• Determine whether there are inadequacies, inconsistencies, and inefficiencies in the DER system
for airborne software
2.12.1 Significant Findings
In this section, 177 airborne respondents indicated they had experience working with a software DER
[L1]. For purposes of this paper, respondents in this section are referred to as "section L respondents".
The following subsections explore possible inadequacies in the DER system by examining satisfaction
and training issues, and explore possible inconsistencies and inefficiencies by examining interaction
between ACOs and DERs, interaction among multiple DERs, and DER competency.
2.12.1.1 Inadequacies
Of the section L respondents, more than 80% said that they were somewhat or very satisfied with their
primary software DER. Just under 10% were either somewhat or very dissatisfied, leaving few (less than
8%) neutral [L2]. Question L15 sought insight into repeated dissatisfaction, if any, with a given software
DER. A large majority, 90%, reported no such pattern; only 10% (17 people) reported repeated
dissatisfaction with their DER. There were two supplemental notes that helped explain this
dissatisfaction. In one case, the DER in question was new. In the other, the respondent suggested that the
DER was not familiar with a particular functional discipline.
In another attempt to gauge overall satisfaction with the DER system, respondents were asked their
opinion of the degree of delegation to software DERs [L12A]. Just over 70% thought the degree of
delegation was about right, 25% thought that more authority should be delegated to DERs, and the
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remaining5%saidthatDERshadtoomuchauthoritynow. Whenaskedif thedegreeof delegationto
softwareDERscausedadverse ffectson costsandschedules[L13], 74%reportedno suchadverse
effects,while26%did. Severalof thesupplementalnotestothisquestionsuggestedthatmoreflexibility
wouldbe useful,with moreor lessauthoritydelegatedto anygivenDER,dependingon individual
abilities.
Trainingfor DERswasexaminedfromtwoperspectives:trainingprovidedby theFAA, andtraining
providedby companies.Almost44%of thesectionL respondentsbelievedthatFAA trainingof DERs
wasinadequate[L21]. Someconfusionispossiblein thisarea,giventhattheFAAdoesnot"train"DERs
in thetraditionalsenseof theword. Rather,theFAA appointsindividualsasDERswhoalreadymeet
certaincriteria,thenexpectsuitablelevelsof practicalactivityandperiodicexposureto theagencyand
itsvariousformsof guidance.Whenaskedwhattrainingshouldbeprovidedto DERsbytheFAA,many
respondentssuggestedstandardizationof DERbehaviorat thenationallevel,anda wishfor deeper
technicalskillsof DERsin softwarework[L22].
In contrast,surveyresultsshowedthata little over28%of therespondentsansweringthetraining
questionworkedfor companiesthatprovidedtrainingspecificto the softwareDERfunction[L23].
Betweenhalf andthree-quartersof that 28% saidthat their companiesprovidedtrainingin DER
procedures,oftwareengineering,thecertificationprocess,DO-178B,andsystemengineering[L24].
Therewasroughlyuniformcoverageof all areasfor thecompaniesin question.
Finally,respondentsansweredquestionsaboutthecompetencyof softwareDERs. Approximately
80%of therespondentssaidtheDERstheyhadworkedwithhadanacceptablebackgroundfor whatthey
wereapproving[L6]. Of the20%thatreportedtheirDERshadaninadequatebackground,abouttwo-
thirdscitedlack of software engineering knowledge as a significant shortcoming. About half reported
lack of DO-178B knowledge in their DER, and a little over a third reported lack of certification knowledge
[L7]. Respondents were also asked whether a software DER had asked anything technical of the
respondent that was not a legitimate part of the FAA software policy and guidance [L12]. Policy and
guidance includes the FARs, DO-178B, FAA Notices, Advisory Circulars and FAA policy memos. Only
11 respondents said that their DERs had levied requirements beyond the official guidance material such
that the impact was substantial.
2.12.1.2 Inconsistencies and Inefficiencies
The first questions here addressed interaction between ACOs and DERs. Question L3 addressed the
ability of DERs to provide certification guidance by asking whether the respondent's software DER had
been in dispute with or overruled by an ACO within the last 3 years. Only 19 of the section L
respondents (about 11%) answered yes. Similarly, L4 asked whether an ACO had required, within the
same period, additional data from the respondent's project, data not previously identified by the DER. A
little less than 15% said that the ACO had required additional information.
Question L17 asked if the respondent's company had ever proposed a delegation to a software DER
that the ACO rejected. Only 117 of the section L respondents answered this question. Of those, 86% said
no. The 14% who said yes had a variety of explanations for the rejection [L18]. The main reasons had to
do with ACO familiarity with the DER in question and a preference by the ACO to retain direct
involvement in the projects.
Another issue regarding interaction between ACOs and DERs involved compliance findings for TSO
projects. Respondents were asked if they had worked on any TSO project where software DERs were
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usedto approvethedata[L10]. Morethanhalf (53%)of thoserespondingto thisquestionsaidyes. The
high frequency suggests that the FAA should investigate the appropriateness of using DERs on TSO
projects.
Respondents were asked about their experience with interactions among DERs on large projects.
Specifically, respondents were asked if they had worked in recent years on a project having multiple
software DERs with overlapping responsibilities, and 38% said yes [L8]. Of the 58 responses in the yes
category, 41% contended that disagreements among the multiple DERs led to schedule delays and wasted
resources [L9]. The remaining 59% believed that no delays or resource waste was attributable to
disagreements among the DERs. Question L11 asked about a succession of DERs, rather than those
whose activities overlap. In this case, 15% of the respondents said they had suffered major rework as a
result of a new DER disagreeing with his or her predecessor. The rest said no. One supplemental note
admitted to some disagreements but said that no major rework ensued.
2.12.2 Summary and Recommendations
Overall, there was a high level of satisfaction with the DER system. The survey indicated additional
training, especially in software engineering and DO-178B, is needed. However, there appeared to be
some misunderstanding about who is responsible for providing DER training. Survey results also
indicated that software DERs were being used to approve data on TSO projects.
Recommendation LI: The FAA should evaluate the adequacy of their current criteria for selecting
software DERs and the procedures to ensure that the DERs meet the competency levels.
Recommendation L2: The FAA should investigate whether software DERs should participate officially
in findings of compliance on TSO projects.
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2.13 Section GL: Using DERs for Ground-based Systems
For ground-based systems, there is no DER-equivalent function specified in the FARs. Although
DERs participate in some ground-based development projects, approval of design data for these systems
currently remains with the FAA directly.
This section of the survey investigated whether the DER system, as implemented in the airborne
sector, would be appropriate for ground-based systems, too. Software DERs assist in ground-based
development projects, but do not have authority to approve design data. Workshop I participants
speculated that cost and time for approval could be reduced if the authority in Title 14 CFR Part 183 were
expanded to allow DER approval of data for ground-based systems. To address this issue, the survey
posed questions about DER contributions to ground-based projects. Only ground-based respondents who
had worked with DERs answered the questions in this section.
The following was the objective for this section.
• Determine whether the DER system would be appropriate for ground-based systems
2.13.1 Significant Findings
Of the 86 ground-based respondents in this survey, only 30 reported experience working with a
software DER on a ground-based project [GL1]. These 30 are referred to as "section GL respondents". A
majority (21) of the section GL respondents worked with navigation systems.
The survey results showed that software DERs were used on ground-based systems for reviewing
architecture, allocating software assurance levels, setting up DO-178B compliant development processes,
and reviewing submissions of DO-178B data prior to FAA submission [GL2]. To a lesser extent, DERs
either conducted or provided oversight to reverse-engineering activities and conducted audit activities
such as test witnessing and traceability thread analysis.
Twenty-eight of the 30 section GL respondents indicated that software DERs helped improve the
ability to understand and comply with DO-178B [GL4]. Only 8 of 30 respondents indicated that the
software DER reduced the effort involved in making improvements to the software architecture [GL5]. A
majority (18) reported that the software DER helped reduce the delay in approval of submissions to the
FAA [GL6].
Overall, the data suggested a positive impact of DER involvement. A majority of the section GL
respondents was satisfied with their experience with software DERs, with 63% reporting they were very
satisfied, and an additional 30% reporting they were somewhat satisfied [GL3]. Two comments on this
question, however, indicated that a lack of consistency between DERs was observed on ground-based
equipment. Over two-thirds of the section GL respondents indicated that the software DER authority
under Title 14 CFR Part 183 should be expanded to allow DERs to attest to the compliance of a submittal
[GL7].
2.13.2 Summary and Recommendations
The survey results showed that respondents believed that DER involvement in ground-based
development projects had a positive impact, in particular in understanding DO-178B and in reducing the
time to approval. Survey respondents favored modification of Title 14 CFR Part 183 to allow DERs to
participate fully in ground-based projects, with assurance that findings and recommendations of the
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airbornecommunityareconsidered.
RecommendationGLl: The FAA should investigateexpansionof Title 14 CFR Part 183,
Representatives of the Administrator, to allow designee authorization for the ground-based community.
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2.14 Section M: Availability of Information about the Certification Process
A claim raised by attendees of the workshops was that insufficient information is available about the
certification process. If this is correct, it has the potential for affecting certification costs significantly.
The following were the objectives for this section.
Determine if the necessary information about software aspects of the certification process is
readily available and, if not, what information is missing
Determine desired format(s) for future information
2.14.1 Significant Findings
Section M began with a general question about obtaining information on software aspects of
certification [M1]. The text of the question asked respondents to what extent they agreed or disagreed
with the statement "Sufficient information is available for obtaining software approvals." The response
choices were strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, and
strongly disagree.
The survey responses to this question were encouraging: 72.3% of the respondents indicated a
positive or neutral response. The positive interpretation of the responses to this question was fairly
consistent with the responses to other, more detailed questions in this section. Note, however, that even
with this favorable response, 27.3% of respondents either somewhat disagree (20.6%) or strongly
disagree (7.1%)--indicating room for improvement.
Survey questions M1A through M7A asked respondents to provide their opinion about the availability
of information in eight specific areas. The areas were: interpreting DO-178B [M1A]; establishing
software levels [M2]; coordinating with the approving authority [M3]; preparing for audits [M4];
obtaining final approval [M5]; obtaining TSO approvals [M6]; obtaining PMA approvals [M7]; and
resolving open software issues [M7A].
In all of these specific areas except one, the responses were similar to those received for the general
question M1. Responses that were either neutral or positive ranged from 58.2% to 80.4% in seven of the
eight cases. The exception was the question that asked the respondents to comment on the statement
"Sufficient information is available for interpreting DO-178B" [M1A]. Thirty-three percent responded
somewhat disagree and 19.3% responded strongly disagree---a total of 52.3% negative responses.
The second objective of section M was to determine desired format(s) for future information [M9 -
M10]. The overwhelming response was a preference for a web site for information distribution. This
supports the Task Force 4 finding of a need for an electronic repository for regulatory information and
technical lessons learned (ref. Final, page 84). CD-ROM and diskettes were next in preference. Paper
was the least preferred media for documentation.
2.14.2 Summary and Recommendations
In general, the survey results showed that sufficient information was available about most software
aspects of certification. However, a large percentage of respondents stated that sufficient information was
not available specifically about interpreting DO-178B.
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RecommendationMI: TheFAA shoulddevelopamechanismfor providingbetterinformationonthe
intent,interpretation, and application of DO-178B.
Recommendation M2: The FAA should continue efforts to make software-related documentation and
training materials available on the web.
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2.15 SectionP: Appropriatenessof DO-178B for Ground-based Systems
A great deal of folklore asserts that ground-based aviation equipment is different from airborne
equipment, and that the methods used for safety analysis and design assurance in avionics cannot or
should not be applied to ground-based systems. The FAA has the legal and administrative mechanisms to
ensure that its oversight of airborne equipment manufacturers is independent of manufacturers' cost and
schedule pressures. Certification for airborne equipment is accomplished in compliance with the FARs.
For ground-based systems, however, the developing group has traditionally been responsible for
commissioning as well. The approval process for ground-based equipment is determined only by FAA
contract documents, policies, and procedures--not by the FARs.
Concems have been raised about the suitability of continuing the current approach for approval of
ground-based systems and specifically about the applicability of airborne system certification standards to
ground-based systems. Some have advocated a certification system similar to that used for airborne
equipment. According to the Task Force 4 report, the Europeans have already begun this transformation
in their approach to ground-based system approval (ref. Final, page 23).
Unlike the other sections of the survey that were motivated by issues raised at Workshop I, the
questions on the appropriateness of DO-178B for ground-based systems were added at the request of the
FAA. Only ground-based respondents were prompted to answer the questions in this section.
The following were the objectives for this section.
• Determine if there is a perception that airborne and ground-based systems are really different
• Determine whether DO-178B fits for ground-based systems
2.15.1 Significant Findings
When asked whether DO-178B is appropriate for ground-based systems, 85% of the 66 respondents
that answered this question either thought DO-178B was acceptable for ground-based systems as is, or
would require only minor changes [P1]. Those who believed it to be inappropriate were asked specific
questions about the suitability of DO-178B for project planning, requirements definition, design capture,
coding, verification, and coordination of commissioning [P2a-f]. In each of those areas, only a small
number (3-6 respondents) indicated that DO-178B was not appropriate.
In addition to the general support for using DO-178B, one-half of the ground-based respondents said
that the ACO model should be used for commissioning of ground-based systems [P3]. That is, the
responsibility for development and acquisition of a new system should be separated from the
responsibility of approving that system. It is interesting to note that a significant number of the ground-
based respondents (37 of 86) indicated that they either did not know or declined to answer this question.
2.15.2 Summary and Recommendations
Although the size of the subset of the survey population responding in this section was quite small, the
survey results showed definite support for the use of DO-178B for ground-based systems. The survey
results also showed support for the separation of acquisition and approval responsibilities for ground-
based systems.
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RecommendationPl: The FAA shouldinvestigatethe feasibility of implementinga regulatory
authorityindependentof theacquisitionbodyforground-basedsystems.
RecommendationP2: TheFAA shouldimplementa planto phasein compliancewith DO-178Bfor
ground-basedsystems.
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3. General Observations
After careful review of the technical recommendations in the previous section, the technical team
made the following six general observations.
Observation 1:
Observation 2:
Observation 3:
Observation 4:
Observation 5:
Observation 6:
Aircraft Certification Offices and other approving authorities create unnecessary cost
burdens through inconsistent guidance, interpretation, and procedural requirements
for software-related issues.
Inconsistencies exist between the airborne and ground-based software approval
processes that create inefficiencies resulting in added costs for the industry and
potentially for the FAA.
The FAA is not keeping pace with rapid advances in software technology, thereby
delaying the use of potentially cost saving technology.
The FAA has not allocated enough people with the requisite software engineering
expertise and knowledge of DO-178B to software approval issues.
Software issues exist for which FAA software policy or guidance is inadequate.
Knowledge of and experience with DO-178B varies substantially within the industry.
These observations are interdependent, with complex cause and effect relationships. All of the
observations involve in one way or another the interpretation of DO-178B. As anyone who has read
Section 2 of this report will realize, inconsistent interpretation of DO-178B was a conspicuous theme
throughout the survey results.
DO-178B requires interpretation for the following reasons:
• DO-178B states what is required and not how to develop software;
• DO-178B has ambiguous terminology; and,
• DO-178B requires non-traditional software engineering practices,
qualification, without providing sufficient background information.
such as MCDC and tool
In software plans, companies must propose methods on how they will comply with DO-178B.
Different companies propose different methods, and these methods may or may not meet the DO-178B
objectives. Assessment of compliance requires a good software engineering background, because many
company methods may not consist of traditional textbook approaches. Therefore, the approving authority
must have an adequate software engineering background to assess compliance.
Variability in the skill set of some developers and regulators has always existed; why is this an issue
now? The reason is that the implications of poor software engineering skills and inadequate resources on
cost and safety have changed with time. Under DO-178A, software engineering skills were less of an
issue because the amount and criticality of software on the aircraft were relatively insignificant. This
limited dependence on software under DO-178A was reasonably balanced with the design and assurance
capability within the FAA and the industry.
Over the last decade, however, software has moved rapidly from an assistance role to a dependency
role. Software-based systems monitor and adjust hydraulic, electrical, fuel, and braking systems, and
control aircraft rudders, wings, and engines. Software is now a factor in safety of flight for fly-by-wire
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aircraft. RTCA developed DO-178B to meet the rising need for design assurance in software.
As software dependency in the aircraft increases, there should be similar increases in software
capability with respect to DO-178B within industry, and increases in FAA capability to assess compliance
to offset potential for decreased safety or increased cost. The amount and criticality of avionics software
have increased significantly since the inception of DO-178B. Survey findings, coupled with those of the
GAO and RTCA Task Force 4, show that industry and the FAA, in general, have not risen to the occasion
to meet the current need. Knowledge of DO-178B varies substantially among civil aviation developers,
the capability of the FAA to address software issues remains inadequate, and software policy and
guidance are lacking. This in turn increases cost and the potential for decreased safety.
To address the imbalance caused by growing dependence on software, FAA technical resources need
to be in a position to evaluate and embrace effective certification practices and mechanisms. The FAA
must acquire and maintain both expertise in software engineering and experience in evaluating new and
emerging technologies. Timely software policy and guidance is needed. Mechanisms that allow the FAA
to efficiently manage the approval of all software-based systems need to be established and assessed
regularly. The aviation industry, including DERs, must also acquire and maintain detailed expertise in
DO-178B.
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4. Recommendations
In response to the six general observations, the technical team developed ten recommendations to
improve the software approval process. These recommendations are more organizational in nature than
the technical recommendations given in Section 2. Implementing these recommendations will require
management support from several FAA organizations. Appendix B contains a letter from the FAA to the
technical team stating the FAA's commitment to review and comment on these recommendations.
The recommendations fall roughly into three categories: (1) recommendations to improve consistency
among approving authorities, (2) recommendations to improve knowledge and skills related to DO-178B
within both the FAA and the industry, and (3) recommendations to improve the ability of the FAA to
assure software in a timely manner.
Recommendations to improve consistency
• The FAA should determine the causes for the inconsistencies noted throughout the report, and
determine what actions, if any, are required in addition to those recommended in this report.
• The FAA should develop unified policy and guidance for approving software aspects of all aviation
systems (e.g., airborne, ground-based, and satellite systems).
• The FAA should institute a regulatory authority independent of acquisition authority for approval of
ground-based systems.
Recommendations to improve knowledge and skills related to DO-178B
The FAA should hire a sufficient number of software engineering experts to understand the safety
impact of software technologies for all aviation systems (e.g., airborne, ground-based, and satellite
systems).
The FAA should improve software expertise within the agency by:
identifying the minimum software staffing needed to assure a consistent approach and timely
response for software approvals for all applicants;
continually assessing software personnel needs and hiring to meet these needs;
requiring software engineers who appoint and advise software designees and who approve
software to meet at least the same qualifications as the designees; and,
creating, funding, and filling software engineering positions throughout the FAA. As a minimum,
the FAA should fund and fill the software positions to assist the field offices and software
engineering experts.
• The FAA should make DO-178B training available to designees.
The FAA should require companies providing software for all aviation systems (e.g., airbome,
ground-based, and satellite systems) to demonstrate competence in DO-178B. The FAA should use
DO-178B competence demonstrated by the applicant as a factor in establishing level of involvement
in software assessment activities.
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Recommendations to improve the ability of the FAA to assure software in a timely manner
The FAA should establish processes for regularly assessing software policy and guidance needs;
developing new software policy and guidance when needed; and assessing and enhancing the clarity,
consistency, and completeness of software policy and guidance.
• The FAA should establish a means to ensure that the software approval process allows applicants to
use appropriate new software technologies in a timely manner.
The FAA should initiate a program of proactive research to evaluate the potential impact of software
technology on cost and safety. The research output should influence the development of policy,
guidance, regulations, and training for software engineering.
The technical team believes that following these recommendations will promote an efficient software
approval process, one that can meet the challenges of increased dependence on software in aviation
equipment. The technical team also recognizes that barriers exist in the current government system that
constrain the FAA's ability to change rapidly. Nevertheless, both the recommendations above and
technical recommendations given in Section 2 should be followed to achieve maximum benefit.
Following the technical recommendations alone would be ineffective.
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5. Conclusions and Future Plans
Software has become ubiquitous. As the medium of choice for enabling advanced automation in both
airborne and ground-based systems, it will form the cornerstone of the National Airspace System. In the
October 1996 issue of Avionics Magazine, David W. Robb wrote (ref. Robb):
"It is no secret that aircraft are becoming ever more dependent on their onboard
electronics. The emerging world of CNS and Free Flight avionics promises to
accelerate this trend dramatically. As this equipment grows more capable and
sophisticated, so does the challenge of testing and maintaining it--for the largest
airline to the smallest General Aviation avionics shop."
Previous studies by the GAO and RTCA concluded that the FAA cannot effectively oversee the
current certification process, much less efficiently acquire and regulate new technologies, without making
significant organizational changes. Evidence gathered from the SSAC workshops and survey clearly
supports the need for organizational change within the FAA, but it also supports change within the
aviation software industry as well. The FAA should implement appropriate infrastructure, staffing, and
policy and guidance to efficiently manage the acquisition and approval of all software-based systems. In
turn, the industry should continue to work with the FAA to develop new standards for emerging
technologies and continue eflbrts to improve software engineering processes.
In conclusion, the technical team hopes that the preliminary findings and recommendations presented
here will help the FAA and industry begin to improve significantly the software approval process for
both. Following the recommendations in this report, along with following-up certain survey findings and
investigating other software issues not covered by the survey, should go a long way towards ensuring that
needed improvements will be made. With apologies to Sir Winston Churchill, this report is not the end, it
is not even the beginning of the end, but, perhaps, it is the end of the beginning.
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Appendix A
SSAC Survey Questionnaire
The complete survey instrument used for the SSAC survey is included here as a reference for the
discussion on significant findings from the survey. The survey was distributed in a Computer Assisted
Self-administered Interviewing format on a floppy disk that could be mn on any IBM compatible personal
computer. Given that several paths can be taken through the survey depending on responses to key
questions, no individual survey respondent likely saw the full set of survey questions. Some of the coding
instructions for implementing the survey are included to help clarify the paths through the survey.
The survey was approved for distribution by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in
compliance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995. The Paperwork Reduction Act establishes
policies and procedures for controlling paperwork burdens imposed by Federal agencies on the public.
Several goals of the legislation are to:
• minimize the Federal paperwork burden on individuals, small businesses, and State and local
governments;
• maximize the usefulness of information collected by the Federal government; and
• minimize the cost to the Federal government of collecting, maintaining, using, and distributing
information.
Federal agencies, including NASA and FAA, are prohibited from enforcing paperwork requirements
that are not approved by the OMB or that do not display the OMB approval number. The OMB number
signifying approval and the statement of compliance with the Paperwork Reduction Act are included in
the introduction to the survey.
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Welcome to the
Survey on Software Aspects of Certification
Conducted by
Center for Survey Research
at
University of Virginia
This questionnaire is about your experiences and opinions concerning software aspects of certification.
In November 1997, a technical team of software engineering and safety experts was asked to study the
processes by which software developed for airborne and ground-based systems are certified or approved
by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The team's objective is to determine if there are ways to
streamline these processes while maintaining or enhancing their contribution to safety.
You have been identified as someone who is involved in software development or certification for
aviation systems. Whether you are new in the industry or an experienced hand, whether you work in a
large or small firm, your viewpoint is important to this study. We need your responses to ensure that our
sample of people in the industry is complete and representative.
By finding out the experiences and opinions of those like you, the team will be able to establish which
issues and problems are broadly experienced, and what opinions are prevalent in the industry. The
technical team will be using the results of this survey to determine if there are ways in which the software
aspects of the certification process can be made easier and more effective without compromising safety.
Your ideas for improving the current system are vital to the success of their mission.
Please answer the questions below candidly and fairly. We assure you that your responses are
confidential. Neither you nor your company will be identified in any report by the team; results will be
reported in aggregate form only.
This survey was approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in compliance with
the Paperwork Reduction Act.
OMB Control # 2120-0635
The Paperwork Reduction Act: A number of concerns have been raised by the aviation industry about
the cost and time burden associated with the current software approval process and with the standards
document, RTCA/DO-178B guidelines "Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment
Certification." In response to these concerns, the FAA started the Streamlining Software Aspects of
Certification (SSAC) program to identify and eliminate unnecessary costs in software aspects of
certification for both airborne and ground-based systems. The information collection will be used by the
SSAC Technical Team to assess the extent and significance of issues pertaining to the software approval
process and to provide an empirical basis from which decisions about software aspects of certification can
be made. It is estimated that it will take 35 minutes per respondent to complete the survey. The
collection of information is voluntary, and confidentiality is neither provided nor necessary. The
information collection will be conducted anonymously. It should be noted that an agency may not
conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to a collection of information unless it
displays a currently valid OMB control number. The paperwork burden associated with this form is
currently approved under OMB control number, 2120-0635.
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SSAC SURVEY SECTION A
SECTION A
First, some questions about you and the projects" you work on.
A1. How long have you been employed (or self-employed) in aviation-related software development or software
approval?
1 less than 2 years 5 20 years or more
2 at least 2 years, less than 5 years 8 not applicable
3 at least 5 years, less than 10 9 don't know/decline to answer
4 at least 10 years, less than 20
A2. How long have you worked for your current employer (or for yourself if self-employed)?
1 less than 2 years 5 20 years or more
2 at least 2 years, less than 5 years 6 I 'm not currently employed
3 at least 5 years, less than 10 9 don't know/decline to answer
4 at least 10 years, less than 20
A2a. What is your current job title?
I-A3. The next questions ask you to describe your software experience over the past five years.
A3a. How much experience have you had in the past five years as a software engineer (responsible for software
requirements, design, verification, or quality assurance)?
1 extensive experience 3 no experience
2 some experience 9 don't know/decline to answer
A3b. How much experience have you had in the past five years as a software engineering lead (responsible for
directing software professionals)?
1 extensive experience 3 no experience
2 some experience 9 don't know/decline to answer
A3c. How much experience have you had in the past five years as a project manager (responsible for the overall
cost and schedule including software)?
1 extensive experience 3 no experience
2 some experience 9 don't know/decline to answer
A3d. And how much experience have you had in the past five years as a certification liaison? (Responsible for
coordination with the Aircraft Certification Office or other approving authority. This includes but is not
limited to company or consultant Designated Engineering Representatives and candidates.)
1 extensive experience 3 no experience
2 some experience 9 don't know/decline to answer
If certification liaison (either 1 or 2 on A3d) complete A3e, otherwise skip to A4
A3e. Are you currently serving as a software Designated Engineering Representative (DER)?
1 yes, asaDER 3 no
2 yes, as a candidate DER 9 don't know/decline to answer
If "no" (3 on A3e), skip to A4, otherwise complete A3f & A3g
A3f. What is your primary role as a software DER?
1 Company DER 2 Consultant DER 9 don't know/decline to answer
54
SSAC SURVEY SECTION A
A3g. Select the highest level of software data you can approve or recommend for approval.
1 LevelA 4 LevelD
2 Level B 9 don't know/decline to answer
3 Level C
A4. In the past five years, have you been directly involved in either the development or approval of software for
application to airborne systems'?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
A5. In the past five years, have you been directly involved in either the development or approval of software for
application to ground-based systems'?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
** RESPONDENTS WITH GROUND-BASED EXPERIENCE ("yes" on A_q) WILL BE TREATED AS GROUND-
BASED ONLY.
A6. What type of company do you work for'?
1 an airborne-equipment supplier 4 other [please specify:]
2 an aircraft manufacturer 9 don't know/decline to answer
3 a ground-systems equipment supplier
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SECTION B - YOUR SOFTWARE TEAM & COMPANY
I-B1. Many of the questions that follow refer to "your experience" in software development and approval. In
answering these questions, please consider your own direct experiences with people and offices as well as events
that have happened on projects you have worked on. For example, if you know for certain that one of your projects
was delayed by a problem at another office, you should consider that delay to be part of "your experience," even if
you never personally interacted with people in the other office. On the other hand, we ask you not to consider as
"your experience" the good or bad events you may have heard about from professional colleagues, unless you were
part of the project, too. By keeping this definition in mind, you will help us to maintain the accuracy of the survey
results.
B2. Which of the following best indicates the number of non-clerical people working on your software
development team? (A team would typically include one or more software engineers, software engineering
leads, project managers, and a certification liaison.)
1 5 people or fewer
2 6-15
3 16-30
4 31-50
5 51-75
6 76-100
7 101 people or more
8 not applicable
9 don't know/decline to answer
If airborne ("yes" to A4 and "no" to A5) complete B3, otherwise skip to B6
B3. For which of the following airborne systems products have
five years? Select all answers that apply.
1 autopilot
2 flight management computer
3 engine control
4 passenger entertainment
5 displays
6 navigation equipment
7 flight controls
you developed or approved software over the last
8 anti-skid braking
9 fuel systems
10 electrical/power systems
11 communication equipment
12 audio systems
13 other [please specify:]
14 no more/don't know/decline to answer
B4. Please indicate the aircraft or engine type most typically
work on. Select all answers that apply.
associated with installation of product line(s) you
1 transport aircraft 7 small turbine engine
2 regional aircraft 8 piston engine
3 business aircraft (Part 91) 9 other [please specify:]
4 general aviation aircraft 10 not applicable
5 rotorcraft 11 no more/don't know/decline to answer
6 large turbine engine
B5. Based on your knowledge, what percentage of the projects you work on receive a Technical Standard Order
authorization?
1 None 5 51-75%
2 1-10% 6 76-100%
3 11-25% 9 don't know/decline to answer
4 26-50%
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If ground-based ("yes" to A5) complete B6, otherwise skip to B7
B6.
B7.
B8
B8a.
B8b.
B8c.
B8d.
B8e.
B9.
B9a.
B9b.
B9c.
For which of the following ground-based systems products have you developed or approved software over
the last five years? Select all answers that apply.
1 communications 5 air traffic management
2 navigation 6 other [please specify:]
3 surveillance 9 no more/don't know/decline to answer
4 automation
Which of the following best describes your own level of experience with developing or approving software in
compliance with DO-178B, either for airborne or ground-based systems?
1 I haven't had any experience with DO-178B.
2 I'm working on my first DO-178B project.
3 I've completed 1-5 DO-178B projects that have been approved.
4 I've completed 6-20 DO-178B projects that have been approved.
5 I've completed 21-50 DO-178B projects that have been approved.
6 I've completed over 50 DO-178B projects that have been approved.
9 don't know/decline to answer
Please indicate if you have personally been involved with developing or approving software under any of the
following in addition to DO-178B.
DO-178A
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
DO-178
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
pre-DO-178
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
military standards
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
other standards
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
And what about your software development team? In the past five years, has your team been involved with
developing or approving software under any of the following in addition to DO-178B?
DO-178A
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
DO-178
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
pre-DO-178
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
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B9d.
B9e.
B10.
Bll.
B12.
B13.
military standards
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
other standards
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
As you know, Level A and Level B are the DO-178B levels of software that are the most critical for safety.
Over the last five years, to what extent have you been involved with development or approval of software that
has significant sections of code that are considered to be at Levels A or B?
1 We do not deal with Level A or Level B code.
2 We deal with Level A or Level B code on only a small portion of our projects.
3 We deal with Level A or Level B code regularly, but on fewer than half our projects.
4 We deal with Level A or Level B code on most of our projects.
5 We deal with Level A or Level B code on every project.
9 don't know/decline to answer
If you could put all of the DO-178B software products you have worked on over the past 5 years into a single
software product, using "kslocs" (thousands of non-commented source lines) estimate the percentage of the
software in each of the following categories:
(Enter "999" for Level A if you are unable to estimate the percentage of software in each category)
1 Level A
2 Level B
3 Level C
4 Level D
5 Level E
SUM = 100%
Think about the largest software project that you are currently working on_ The project could be a piece of a
product, a single product (such as a Flight Management System), or a combined suite of products (such as an
Information Management System that contains a flight management system, displays, communication, etc.).
Please indicate the overall size of the project (measured in "ksloc"--thousands of non-commented source
lines).
1 less than 1 ksloc
2 lkto 9k
3 lOk to 29k
4 30kto 59k
5 60kto 99k
6 100k to 199k
7 200k to 349k
8 more than 350k
9 don't know/decline to answer
Based on your knowledge, please estimate the number of DO-178B approved projects (including re-
certifications) your company completes per year.
1 None 5 21-35
2 1-5 6 36-50
3 6-10 7 more than 50
4 11-20 9 don't know/decline to answer
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If airborne ("yes" to A4 and "no" to A5) complete B14 - B14B, otherwise skip to B15
B14. For airborne software, which Aircraft Certification Office do you interact with most frequently? (We will
refer to this ACO as your primary ACO.)
1 Anchorage Aircraft Certification Office (ACE-115N)
2 Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office (ACE-115A)
3 Boston Aircraft Certification Office (ANE-150)
4 Chicago Aircraft Certification Office (ACE-115C)
5 Denver Aircraft Certification Office (ANM-100D)
6 Engine Certification Office (ANE-140)
7 Fort Worth Airplane Certification Office (ASW-150)
8 Fort Worth Rotorcraft Certification Office (ASW-170)
9 Fort Worth Special Certification Office (ASW-190)
10 Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ANM-100L)
11 New York Aircraft Certification Office (ANE-170)
12 Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ANM-100S)
13 Wichita Aircraft Certification Office (ACE-115W)
14 Brussels Aircraft Certification Division (AEU-100)
15 not applicable to my company
16 don't know/decline to answer
B 14A. Is this the ACO that covers your geographic location?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
B 14B. Are there other ACOs that you interact with?
apply.
If so, please select them from this list. Select all answers that
1 Anchorage Aircraft Certification Office (ACE-115N)
2 Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office (ACE-115A)
3 Boston Aircraft Certification Office (ANE-150)
4 Chicago Aircraft Certification Office (ACE-115C)
5 Denver Aircraft Certification Office (ANM-100D)
6 Engine Certification Office (ANE-140)
7 Fort Worth Airplane Certification Office (ASW-150)
8 Fort Worth Rotorcraft Certification Office (ASW-170)
9 Fort Worth Special Certification Office (ASW-190)
10 Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ANM-100L)
11 New York Aircraft Certification Office (ANE-170)
12 Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ANM-100S)
13 Wichita Aircraft Certification Office (ACE-115W)
14 Brussels Aircraft Certification Division (AEU-100)
15 no more/don't know/decline to answer
If ground based ("yes" to A5) complete B15, otherwise skip to B16
B 15. Which FAA organization acts as the approval authority for your projects? Note that more than one approval
authority may be indicated if you are responding for more than one type of project.
1 Product Team for the Global Positioning System (FAA AND-730) for the Local Area Augmentation
System (LAAS) and the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS)
2 Product Team for Navigation and Landing (FAA AND-740) for the Instrument Landing System (ILS) &
Transponder Landing System (TLS)
3 GPS, Navigation and Landing Branch (FAA AOS-240) for the Differential Global Positioning Systems
for Special Category I (SCAT-I)
4 other [please specify:]
5 not applicable to my company
9 don't know/decline to answer
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B16. Companies that develop software may have been assessed to have a certain Capability Maturity Model rating
or CMM level. If you have been assessed, which CMM level applies to your company'?
1 CMM Level 1 4 CMM Level 4
2 CMM Level 2 5 CMM Level 5
3 CMM Level 3 9 don't know/decline to answer
If "don't know" to B16, skip to Section C
B 17. If you have a CMM level rating, what type of assessment was used to determine your company's CMM level'?
1 Self-Assessment 2 External Assessment 9 don't know/decline to answer
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SECTION C - FAA POLICY, GUIDANCE, AND AUDITS
C1. Overall, how satisfied are you with the current FAA process for software aspects of certification? Are you:
1 very satisfied 4 somewhat dissatisfied
2 somewhat satisfied 5 very dissatisfied
3 neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 9 don't know/decline to answer
I-C2. The following 16 questions are concerned with the extent to which written existing FAA software policy and
guidance provide the information you need to develop software to meet objectives in DO-178B.
For each of l6 different subjects', you will be asked whether the written FAA software policy and guidance is ample,
sufficient, or insufficient, or whether you are unable to rate the level of information provided.
[DEFINITION: "Written policy and guidance" refers to: the Federal Aviation Regulations, DO-178B, FAA
Notices, FAA Orders, Advisory Circulars, and FAA policy memos.]
C2a. In the area below, would you say the written FAA software policy and guidance is ample, barely sufficient, or
insufficient in providing the information you need to comply with DO-178B; or are you unable to rate the
level of information provided?
planning
1 ample 2 barely sufficient 3 insufficient 4 unable to rate 9 don't know
C2b. In the area below, would you say the written FAA software policy and guidance is ample, barely sufficient, or
insufficient in providing the information you need to comply with DO-178B; or are you unable to rate the
level of information provided?
requirements
1 ample 2 barely sufficient 3 insufficient 4 unable to rate 9 don't know
C2c. In the area below, would you say the written FAA software policy and guidance is ample, barely sufficient, or
insufficient in providing the information you need to comply with DO-178B; or are you unable to rate the
level of information provided?
design
1 ample 2 barely sufficient 3 insufficient 4 unable to rate 9 don't know
C2d. In the area below, would you say the written FAA software policy and guidance is ample, barely sufficient, or
insufficient in providing the information you need to comply with DO-178B; or are you unable to rate the
level of information provided?
code
1 ample 2 barely sufficient 3 insufficient 4 unable to rate 9 don't know
C2e. In the area below, would you say the written FAA software policy and guidance is ample, barely sufficient, or
insufficient in providing the information you need to comply with DO-178B; or are you unable to rate the
level of information provided?
verification
1 ample 2 barely sufficient 3 insufficient 4 unable to rate 9 don't know
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C2f.
C2g.
C2h.
C2i.
c2j.
C21.
C2m.
C2n.
In the area below, would you say the written FAA software policy and guidance 1s ample, barely sufficient, or
insufficient in providing the information you need to comply with DO-178B; or are you tmable to rate the
level of information provided?
configuration management
1 ample 2 barely sufficient 3 insufficient 4 tmable to rate 9 don't know
In the area below, would you say the written FAA software policy and guidance 1s ample, barely sufficient, or
insufficient in providing the information you need to comply with DO-178B; or are you tmable to rate the
level of information provided?
quality assurance
1 ample 2 barely sufficient 3 insufficient 4 tmable to rate 9 don't know
In the area below, would you say the written FAA software policy and guidance 1s ample, barely sufficient, or
insufficient in providing the information you need to comply with DO-178B; or are you tmable to rate the
level of information provided?
certification liaison
1 ample 2 barely sufficient 3 insufficient 4 tmable to rate 9 don't know
In the area below, would you say the written FAA software policy and guidance 1s ample, barely sufficient, or
insufficient in providing the information you need to comply with DO-178B; or are you tmable to rate the
level of information provided?
COTS
1 ample 2 barely sufficient 3 insufficient 4 tmable to rate 9 don't know
In the area below, would you say the written FAA software policy and guidance 1s ample, barely sufficient, or
insufficient in providing the information you need to comply with DO-178B; or are you tmable to rate the
level of information provided?
legacy software and software reuse
1 ample 2 barely sufficient 3 insufficient 4 tmable to rate 9 don't know
In the area below, would you say the written FAA software policy and guidance 1s ample, barely sufficient, or
insufficient in providing the information you need to comply with DO-178B; or are you tmable to rate the
level of information provided?
user-modifiable software
1 ample 2 barely sufficient 3 insufficient 4 tmable to rate 9 don't know
In the area below, would you say the written FAA software policy and guidance 1s ample, barely sufficient, or
insufficient in providing the information you need to comply with DO-178B; or are you tmable to rate the
level of information provided?
partitioning
1 ample 2 barely sufficient 3 insufficient 4 tmable to rate 9 don't know
In the area below, would you say the written FAA software policy and guidance 1s ample, barely sufficient, or
insufficient in providing the information you need to comply with DO-178B; or are you tmable to rate the
level of information provided?
service history
1 ample 2 barely sufficient 3 insufficient 4 tmable to rate 9 don't know
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C2o. In the area below, would you say the written FAA software policy and guidance is ample, barely sufficient, or
insufficient in providing the information you need to comply with DO-178B; or are you unable to rate the
level of information provided?
tool qualification
1 ample 2 barely sufficient 3 insufficient 4 unable to rate 9 don't know
C2p. In the area below, would you say the written FAA software policy and guidance is ample, barely sufficient, or
insufficient in providing the information you need to comply with DO-178B; or are you unable to rate the
level of information provided?
classification of major and minor software changes
1 ample 2 barely sufficient 3 insufficient 4 unable to rate 9 don't know
C2q. In the area below, would you say the written FAA software policy and guidance is ample, barely sufficient, or
insufficient in providing the information you need to comply with DO-178B; or are you unable to rate the
level of information provided?
alternate means of compliance
1 ample 2 barely sufficient 3 insufficient 4 unable to rate 9 don't know
C2r. Is there any area not listed above for which insufficient information is available for you to get your software
through the approval process?
1 no 2 yes [please specify:] 9 don't know/decline to answer
C2A. Overall, how satisfied are you with existing written FAA software policy and guidance?
1 very satisfied 4 somewhat dissatisfied
2 somewhat satisfied 5 very dissatisfied
3 neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 9 don't know/decline to answer
**THIS VERSION OF QUESTION C3 IS FOR AIRBORNE ONLY:
C3. In the past five years, have you participated in a domestic regulatory audit for software; that is, a software
review conducted specifically by FAA regulatory personnel (as opposed to a software review conducted by a
DER)?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
**THIS VERSION OF QUESTION C3 IS FOR GROUND-BASED ONLY:
GC3. In the past five years, have you participated in a domestic regulatory software audit; that is, a software review
conducted specifically by regulatory personnel such as FAA personnel from the Product Team for the Global
Positioning System (FAA AND-730), the Product Team for Navigation and Landing (FAA AND-740), or the
GPS, Navigation and Landing Branch (FAA AOS-240)?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
** WORDING IN C4 WILL VARY AUTOMATICALLY DEPENDING ON AIRBORNE OR GROUND-BASED
RESPONDENT.
If experienced with audits (1 to C3or GC3) complete C4, otherwise skip to section D
C4. How many times does [your primary ACO/the approving authority] typically conduct a regulatory software
audit on each of your projects?
1 none 5 four or more times
2 once 6 the number of audits varies significantly from project to project
3 twice 9 don't know/decline to answer
4 three times
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c5.
c6.
c7.
c9.
C10.
What is your opinion about the number of regulatory software audits that are involved with bringing a typical
project to a successful conclusion'? Is the number of audits:
1 too few to ensure full compliance 3 more than is really needed
2 about right for ensuring compliance 9 don't know/decline to answer
In your experience, what is the typical duration of a regulatory software audit?
1 1-2 days 4 the duration varies significantly
2 3-5 days 9 don't know/decline to answer
3 more than one week
What is your opinion of the typical duration of a regulatory software audit?
1 too short 4 substantially longer than necessary
2 about right 9 don't know/decline to answer
3 a little longer than necessary
There are two approaches to getting DO-178B approval: regulatory on-site software audit (location may be
either at the regulator's site or the applicant's site) or desktop review (regulator review of data only, no
applicant support required).
How much extra preparation by your team is necessary to support a regulatory on-site software audit over and
above what a desktop review would require'? (Please include the eftort of subcontractors and consultants as
applicable.)
1 no time 5 11-15 person-days
2 1-2 person-days 6 more than 15 person-days
3 3-5 person-days 9 don't know/decline to answer
4 6-10 person-days
Which of the following best describes your opinion about the depth of regulatory software audits you have
been involved with in the past five years'?
1 Regulatory software audits are superficial and strictly routine
2 Regulatory software audits are excessively detailed and probing
3 Regulatory software audits are usually about right
4 Regulatory software audits vary significantly depending on the reviewer
9 don't know/decline to answer
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SECTION D - YOUR PRIMARY ACO AND OTHER ACOs
** PROGRAM WILL AUTOMATE THIS SKIP: This section is for airborne respondents only. Ground-based
respondents, please go to Section GD.
D 1. Do you interact enough with your ACO to rate their performance regarding software aspects of certification?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
If "yes" then continue; otherwise skip to Section E
D2. Overall, how satisfied are you with the job your primary ACO is doing with software aspects of certification?
Are you ...
1 very satisfied 4 somewhat dissatisfied
2 somewhat satisfied 5 very dissatisfied
3 neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 9 don't know/decline to answer
I-D3. For each of the following attributes, how would you rate your primary ACO? Would you rate each of the
following as excellent, very good, good, fair, poor, or are you unable to rate the attribute of your primary
ACO?
D3a. The first attribute is: returning phone calls
1 excellent 2 very good 3 good 4 fair 5 poor 9 don't know
D3b. The next attribute is: responding to written communication
1 excellent 2 very good 3 good 4 fair 5 poor 9 don't know
D3c. The next attribute is: addressing certification issues
1 excellent 2 very good 3 good 4 fair 5 poor 9 don't know
D3d. The next attribute is: establishing and honoring dates for reviews and approvals
1 excellent 2 very good 3 good 4 fair 5 poor 9 don't know
D3e. The next is: coordinating meetings/reviews
1 excellent 2 very good 3 good 4 fair 5 poor 9 don't know
D3g. The next is: coordination with technical resources & national policy making
1 excellent 2 very good 3 good 4 fair 5 poor 9 don't know
D3h. The next is: responding to submitted plans
1 excellent 2 very good 3 good 4 fair 5 poor 9 don't know
D4. Do you have any additional positive or negative comments about your experience working with your primary
ACO?
D5. In your opinion, are different companies handled differently within the same ACO?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
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If "yes", then answer D6, otherwise skip to D7
D6. Which of the following describe ways that companies are treated differently? Select all answers that apply.
D7.
If tWO
D8.
1 use of designees
2 schedule responsiveness on the part of the ACO
3 differing requirements for compliance data for certification of modified products
4 differing interpretation and application of written FAA policy and guidance
5 other [please specify:]
9 no more/don't know/decline to answer
In the past five years, how many ACOs have you worked with?
1 1 3 3 or more
2 2 9 don't know/decline to answer
or more (2 or 3 on D7), then answer D8; otherwise skip to D20
Which of the following describes the main reason for using multiple ACOs?
1 company choice 3 other [please specify:]
2 customer's geographic region 9 don't know/decline to answer
D9. In the past three years, have you ever received inconsistent software guidance, interpretations, or procedural
requirements from different ACOs?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
If"yes" on D9, continue; otherwise, skip to D20
D12. How often have you or your team received inconsistent software guidance, interpretations, or procedural
guidance from two or more ACOs?
1 once 4 frequently
2 rarely 9 don't know/decline to answer
3 occasionally
D13. How would you rate the general degree of inconsistency between the ACOs you deal with?
1 they differ only in minor details
2 they occasionally differ in substantial ways
3 they seem to have fundamentally different approaches and requirements
9 don't know/decline to answer
D13a. How have the inconsistencies affected your costs?
1 they've caused major additional costs
2 they've caused only minor additional costs
3 they've not added to cost
4 we've saved cost by taking advantage of the alternatives offered by different ACOs
9 don't know/decline to answer
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DIO. Please indicate the area(s) of inconsistent guidance, interpretation, or procedural requirements among ACOs.
Select all answers that apply.
1 TSO
2 PMA
3 TC
4 STC
5 issue paper
6 special condition
7 policy memo
8 notices and orders
9 verbal direction
10 interpretation of DO-178B
11 advisory circulars
12 ACO procedures
13 other [please specify:]
14 no more/don't know/decline to answer
DlOb. And which one of these areas of inconsistency has caused you the greatest consequences?
1 TSO 8 notices and orders
2 PMA 9 verbal direction
3 TC 10 interpretation of DO-178B
4 STC 11 advisory circulars
5 issue paper 12 ACO procedures
6 special condition 13 other [please specify:]
7 policy memo 14 don't know/decline to answer
D20. In the past three years, have you received inconsistent software guidance from different people within the
same ACO?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
If "yes" then continue, otherwise skip to D25
D21. From within which ACO have you most often received inconsistent software guidance, interpretations, or
procedural guidance from different people?
1 Anchorage Aircraft Certification Office (ACE-115N)
2 Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office (ACE-115A)
3 Boston Aircraft Certification Office (ANE-150)
4 Chicago Aircraft Certification Office (ACE-115C)
5 Denver Aircraft Certification Office (ANM-100D)
6 Engine Certification Office (ANE-140)
7 Fort Worth Airplane Certification Office (ASW-150)
8 Fort Worth Rotorcraft Certification Office (ASW-170)
9 Fort Worth Special Certification Office (ASW-190)
10 Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ANM-100L)
11 New York Aircraft Certification Office (ANE-170)
12 Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ANM-100S)
13 Wichita Aircraft Certification Office (ACE-115W)
14 Brussels Aircraft Certification Division (AEU-100)
16 don't know/decline to answer
D22. We've fotmd people within this ACO to be inconsistent with one another ...
1 once 4 frequently
2 rarely 9 don't know/decline to answer
3 occasionally
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D23. How have the inconsistencies affected your costs?
1 they've caused major additional costs
2 they've caused only minor additional costs
3 they've not added to cost
4 we've saved cost by taking advantage of the alternatives offered by different people within the ACO
9 don't know/decline to answer
D24. Please indicate the area(s) of inconsistent guidance, interpretation, or procedural requirements you receive
from different people within the same ACO. Select all answers that apply.
1 TSO
2 PMA
3 TC
4 STC
5 issue paper
6 special condition
7 policy memo
8 notices and orders
9 verbal direction
10 interpretation of DO-178B
11 advisory circulars
12 ACO procedures
13 other [please specify:]
14 no more/don't know/decline to answer
D24a. And which one of these areas of inconsistency has caused you the greatest consequences?
1 TSO 8 notices and orders
2 PMA 9 verbal direction
3 TC 10 interpretation of DO-178B
4 STC 11 advisory circulars
5 issue paper 12 ACO procedures
6 special condition 13 other [please specify:]
7 policy memo 14 don't know/decline to answer
D25. Have you ever been under the impression that you reached a verbal agreement with an ACO about a
software-related certification issue and later that agreement was nullified by the FAA?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
D26. Have you ever had a written agreement with an ACO about a software-related certification issue and later
that agreement was nullified by the FAA?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
If "yes" on D25 or D26 continue, otherwise skip to section E
D27. Which of the following explanations best describes why the agreement changed?
apply.
1 the system you developed changed & the certification basis changed
2 FAA rules changed
3 FAA personnel changed
4 company personnel changed
5 the original FAA parties to the agreement rescinded it
6 a simple misunderstanding and no one is really to blame
7 other [please specify:]
9 no more/don't know/decline to answer
Select all answers that
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SECTION GD - APPROVING AUTHORITIES
** PROGRAM WILL TAKE CARE OF THIS SKIP: If you have been directly involved with software for GROUND-
BASED systems ("yes" on A5), please answer the questions in this section. If NOT, please go to Section E.
I-GD1. Some questions about the approving authorities you have worked with ...
GD1. Do you directly communicate or interact with any of the following FAA organizations?
FAA AND-730: Product Team for the Global Positioning System for the Local Area Augmentation System
(LAAS) and the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS)
FAA AND-740: Product Team for Navigation and Landing for the Instrument Landing System (ILS) and
Transponder Landing System (TLS)
FAA AOS-240: GPS, Navigation and Landing Branch for the Differential Global Positioning Systems for
Special Category I (SCAT-I)
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
If "yes" then continue; otherwise skip to Section E
GD2. Which do you consider to be your primary approving authority--that is, the one your team works with most
often?
1 AND-730 4 we work equally with all of them
2 AND-740 9 don't know/decline to answer
3 AOS-240
GD3. Overall, how satisfied are you with the job your primary approving authority is doing with software aspects
of approval'? Are you:
1 very satisfied 4 somewhat dissatisfied
2 somewhat satisfied 5 very dissatisfied
3 neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 9 don't know/decline to answer
I-GD4. For each of the following attributes, how would you rate your primary approving authority? Would you
rate each of the following as excellent, very good, good, fair, poor, or are you unable to rate the attribute of your
primary approving authority?
GD4a. The first attribute is: returning phone calls
1 excellent 2 very good 3 good 4 fair 5 poor 9 don't know
GD4b.The next attribute is: responding to written communication
1 excellent 2 very good 3 good 4 fair 5 poor 9 don't know
GD4c. The next attribute is: addressing certification issues
1 excellent 2 very good 3 good 4 fair 5 poor 9 don't know
GD4d.The next attribute is: establishing & honoring dates for reviews and approvals
1 excellent 2 very good 3 good 4 fair 5 poor 9 don't know
GD4e. The next is: coordinating meetings/reviews
1 excellent 2 very good 3 good 4 fair 5 poor 9 don't know
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GD4g.The next is: coordination with technical resources & national policy making
1 excellent 2 very good 3 good 4 fair 5 poor 9 don't know
GD4h.The next is: responding to submitted plans
1 excellent 2 very good 3 good 4 fair 5 poor 9 don't know
GD5. Do you have any additional positive or negative comments about your experience working with your primary
approving authority?
GD6. Have you ever used both an AND organization (either AND-740 or AND-730) and AOS-240 for approval of
software for ground-based systems?
FAA AND-730: Product Team for the Global Positioning System for the Local Area Augmentation System
(LAAS) and the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS)
FAA AND-740: Product Team for Navigation and Landing for the Instrument Landing System (ILS) and
Transponder Landing System (TLS)
FAA AOS-240: GPS, Navigation and Landing Branch for the Differential Global Positioning Systems for
Special Category I (SCAT-I)
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
If "yes" to GD6 continue, otherwise skip to GD21
GD7. Which of the following best describes the reason for using both approving authorities'?
1 company choice 3 other [please specify:]
2 customer requirement 9 don't know/decline to answer
GD8. Have you ever received inconsistent software guidance, interpretations, or procedural requirements from an
AND organization (either AND-740 or AND-730) and AOS-240?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
GD21.Have you ever been under the impression that you reached a verbal agreement with an approving authority
about a software-related issue and later that agreement was nullified by the FAA?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
GD22.Have you ever had a written agreement with an approving authority about a software-related issue and later
that agreement was nullified by the FAA?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
If "yes" on GD21 or GD22 continue, otherwise skip to Section E
GD23.Which of the following explanations best describes why the agreement changed?
apply.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
9
Select all answers that
the system you developed changed & the certification basis changed
FAA rules changed
FAA personnel changed
company personnel changed
the original FAA parties to the agreement rescinded it
a simple misunderstanding and no one is really to blame
other [please specify:]
no more/don't know/decline to answer
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SECTION E - QUESTIONS ABOUT INDEPENDENCE
El. Which one of the following definitions best meets the intent of DO-178B with respect to independence?
1 the person who verifies the activity is different from the person who produces the artifact under
consideration
2 verification must be performed separately from the development organization
9 don't know/decline to answer
E2. Overall, how satisfied are you with the requirements for independence in DO-178B? Are you:
1 very satisfied 4 somewhat dissatisfied
2 somewhat satisfied 5 very dissatisfied
3 neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 9 don't know/decline to answer
If 2,3,4, or 5 to E2 continue, otherwise skip to E5
E3. With which independence requirements (if any) do you disagree? If appropriate, it would be helpful to
mention the Annex A Table, objective, and software level to which your comments relate.
E5. In your experience, about how big are the software development costs attributed to independence, including
meeting the objectives in DO-178B?
1 a negligible cost 4 a nearly prohibitive cost
2 a small cost 5 unable to estimate
3 a substantial cost 9 don't know/decline to answer
E6. About how much software development time would you estimate is attributed to independence, including
meeting the objectives in DO-178B?
1 none or a negligible amount of time 4 a nearly prohibitive amount of time
2 a small amount of time 5 unable to estimate
3 a substantial amount of time 9 don't know/decline to answer
E7. How much software development time and cost would
required to meet the objectives in DO-178B?
1 same as now
2 almost as much as now
3 substantially less than now
your company devote to independence if you were not
4 none
5 unable to estimate
9 don't know/decline to answer
E8. In your opinion, are D O - 178B' s requirements for independence:
1 extremely valuable 4 of no value
2 somewhat valuable 5 unable to estimate
3 of marginal value 9 don't know/decline to answer
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SECTION F - MODIFIED CONDITION DECISION COVERAGE
F0. In the past five years, have you been directly involved in either the development or approval of Level A
software?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
If"yes", continue; otherwise, skip to GI
I-F1. MCDC is a level of structural coverage beyond decision coverage, where each condition in a decision must
be shown to independently affect that decision's outcome.
F1. For you and your team, how hard is it to comply with the mcdc objective?
1 trivially simple 4 extremely difficult
2 moderately simple 9 don't know/decline to answer
3 moderately difficult
Flb. Which aspects of complying with the mcdc objective are difficult?
F2. Do you or your team perform mcdc on the source code?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
F3. Do you or your team perform mcdc on the object code?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
F4. Which of the following statements best describes your experience with meeting the structural coverage
objective for mcdc?
1 We have never found any errors using mcdc.
2 We have rarely found errors using mcdc that were not found in other testing.
3 We have occasionally found errors using mcdc that were not found in other testing.
4 We have frequently found errors using mcdc that were not found in other testing.
9 don't know/decline to answer
If2,3,4 on F4, continue; otherwise skip to F5
F4B. Were any of the errors discovered using mcdc safety-related?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
F5. For Level A systems, do you perform traceability analysis from source to object code to determine what
additional verification is necessary for object code that is not directly traceable to the source code?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
If "yes" to F5 continue, otherwise skip to F8
F6. Has this resulted in additional verification'?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
F7. If additional verification did result, were any errors detected?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
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If "yes" on F7, continue; otherwise skip to F8
F7a. Were any of the errors safety-related?
F8.
F9a.
F9b.
F9c.
F9d.
Fll.
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
Which of the following best describes the way your team usually achieves structural coverage?
1 we first do requirements-based testing and use the results to determine if additional structural testing is
necessary
2 we develop a test suite to perform structural coverage independent of requirements-based testing
3 other [please specify:]
9 don't know/decline to answer
In your team's experience, about how big are the software development costs attributed to performing mcdc,
including meeting the objective in DO-178B?
1 a negligible cost 4 a nearly prohibitive cost
2 a small cost 5 unable to estimate
3 a substantial cost 9 don't know/decline to answer
About how much software development time would you estimate is attributed to performing mcdc, including
meeting the objective in DO-178B?
1 none or a negligible amount of time 4 a nearly prohibitive amount of time
2 a small amount of time 5 unable to estimate
3 a substantial amount of time 9 don't know/decline to answer
How much software development time and cost would your company devote to performing mcdc if you were
not required to meet the objective in DO-178B?
1 same as now 4 none
2 almost as much as now 5 unable to estimate
3 substantially less than now 9 don't know/decline to answer
In your opinion, is DO-178B's requirement for mcdc:
1 extremely valuable 4 of no value
2 somewhat valuable 5 unable to estimate
3 of marginal value 9 don't know/decline to answer
For Level A systems, how would you rate the overall value of mcdc?
1 extremely valuable 4 of no value
2 somewhat valuable 5 unable to estimate
3 of marginal value 9 don't know/decline to answer
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SECTION G - PRACTICES REGARDING TRACEABILITY
G1. Do you or your team use traceability for requirements coverage?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
G3. Do you or your team use traceability for regression analysis and testing?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
G5. Do you or your team use traceability for change impact analysis'?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
G7. Do you or your team use traceability only for certification?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
Gg. Do you or your team use traceability for identifying unnecessary source code?
G10.
Gll.
1 yes 2 no 9
In your opinion, is the use of traceability:
1 extremely valuable
2 somewhat valuable
3 of marginal value
don't know/decline to answer
4 of no value
5 unable to estimate
9 don't know/decline to answer
Do you or your team document traceability from source code to object code?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
If "yes" to Gll then continue, otherwise skip to G13
G12. Why do you do it'? Select all answers that apply.
1 company procedures
2 ACO requirement
3 DER requirement
G13.
G14.
G15.
4 DO-178B requirement
5 other [please specify:]
9 no more/don't know/decline to answer
In your team's experience, about how big are the software development costs attributed to traceability,
including meeting the objectives in DO-178B?
1 a negligible cost 4 a nearly prohibitive cost
2 a small cost 5 unable to estimate
3 a substantial cost 9 don't know/decline to answer
About how much software development time would
meeting the objectives in DO-178B?
1 none or a negligible amount of time
2 a small amount of time
3 a substantial amount of time
you estimate is attributed to traceability, including
4 a nearly prohibitive amount of time
5 unable to estimate
9 don't know/decline to answer
How much software development time and cost would your company devote to traceability if you were not
required to meet the objectives in DO-178B?
1 same as now 4 no time as all
2 almost as much as now 5 unable to estimate
3 substantially less than now 9 don't know/decline to answer
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G16. In your opinion, are DO-178B's requirements for traceability:
1 extremely valuable 4 of no value
2 somewhat valuable 5 unable to estimate
3 of marginal value 9 don't know/decline to answer
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SECTION H - QUALITY ASSURANCE
I-H1. Please indicate your level of agreement with these statements:
H1. How would you rate the overall value of meeting SQA objective 1 (Assurance is obtained that software
development and integral processes comply with approved software plans and standards) as defined in Table
A-9 of Annex A in DO-178B?
1 extremely valuable 4 of no value
2 somewhat valuable 5 unable to estimate
3 of marginal value 9 don't know/decline to answer
H2. How would you rate the overall value of meeting SQA objective 2 (Assurance is obtained that transition
criteria for the software life cycle processes are satisfied) as defined in Table A-9 of Annex A in DO-178B?
1 extremely valuable 4 of no value
2 somewhat valuable 5 unable to estimate
3 of marginal value 9 don't know/decline to answer
H3. How would you rate the overall value of meeting SQA
as defined in Table A-9 of Annex A in DO-178B?
1 extremely valuable
2 somewhat valuable
3 of marginal value
objective 3 (Software conformity review is conducted)
4 of no value
5 unable to estimate
9 don't know/decline to answer
H4. In your team's experience, about how big are the software development costs attributed to quality assurance,
including meeting the objectives in DO-178B?
1 a negligible cost 4 a nearly prohibitive cost
2 a small cost 5 unable to estimate
3 a substantial cost 9 don't know/decline to answer
H5. About how much software development time would you estimate is attributed to quality assurance, including
meeting the objectives in DO-178B?
1 none or a negligible amount of time 4 a nearly prohibitive amount of time
2 a small amount of time 5 unable to estimate
3 a substantial amount of time 9 don't know/decline to answer
H6. How much software development time and cost would
not required to meet the objectives in DO-178B?
1 same as now
2 almost as much as now
3 substantially less than now
your company devote to quality assurance if you were
4 none
5 unable to estimate
9 don't know/decline to answer
H7. In your opinion, are DO-178B's requirements for quality assurance:
1 extremely valuable 4 of no value
2 somewhat valuable 5 unable to estimate
3 of marginal value 9 don't know/decline to answer
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SECTION I - DOCUMENTATION
I1. How strictly do you and your team follow the format given in Chapter 11 (Software Life Cycle Data) in DO-
178B for packaging data?
1 very strictly 4 don't follow at all
2 follow closely with occasional exceptions 9 don't know/decline to answer
3 use as guidance only
I2. Who determines the degree of rigor in following the format given in Chapter 11 of DO-178B for packaging
data?
1 company procedures 4 other [please specify:]
2 ACO requirement 9 don't know/decline to answer
3 DER requirement
I3. Within the past 5 years, has your approving authority rejected your proposed format for delivery of
certification data or documentation?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
If "yes" on 13 then continue, otherwise skip to 16
I4. How many submittals have been affected?
1 one
2 two
3 three or four
4 five or more
9 don't know/decline to answer
I5. Which of the following best describes the reasons given for these rejections? Select all answers that apply.
1 DO-178B requirement
2 requirement by the ACO or other approving authority
3 personal preference of the ACO or other approving authority
4 other [please specify:]
9 no more/don't know/decline to answer
I6. Have you ever been asked to provide software data or documentation to an approving authority that is not
required by DO-178B or the FAils'?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
If "yes" on 16 then continue, otherwise skip to ISA
I7. Please specify the data or documentation you were asked to provide.
I8. How much additional cost has been incurred as a result?
1 none or a negligible cost 4
2 a small cost 5
3 a substantial cost 9
a nearly prohibitive cost
unable to estimate
don't know/decline to answer
I8A. Have you ever been asked to provide software data or documentation to an approving authority that was not
specified in your Plan for Software Aspects of Certification (PSAC) that they approved'?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
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19. Have you ever been asked to update software data or documentation that had no impact on the approval or
continued safety or maintenance of the product, at or near the end of the project (for example, a PSAC)?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
If "yes" on 19 then continue, otherwise skip to 111
I10. Has approval been delayed as a result'?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
I11. For DO-178B approval of a new software-based system, do you believe that the data requirements to meet
DO- 178B are excessive'?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
If "yes" to 111 then continue, otherw, ise skip to 113
I12. Which specific data requirements do you believe are unnecessary'?
I13. For DO-178B approval of a derivative or follow-on software-based system, do you believe that the data
requirements to meet DO-178B are excessive?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
If "yes" to 113 then continue, otherwise skip to 115
I14. Which specific data requirements do you believe are unnecessary'?
I15. Is there data required by DO-178B that you provide strictly to meet certification requirements (excluding the
PSAC, Configuration Index, and Accomplishment Summary) and that you do not use as part of your software
development process?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
If "yes" on 115 then continue, otherwise skip to J1
I16. Please specify which data.
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SECTION J - TOOL QUALIFICATION
J1. Do you have any experience with tool qualification?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
If "yes", please continue, otherwise skip to K1
J2. Have you ever found any errors in a software development tool during tool qualification'?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
J2A. Have you ever found any errors in a software verification tool during tool qualification?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
J3. Do you believe the requirements in DO-178B for qualification of software development tools are:
1 too weak 3 too stringent
2 about right 9 don't know/decline to answer
J3AA. Do you believe the requirements in DO-178B for qualification of software verification tools are:
1 too weak 3 too stringent
2 about right 9 don't know/decline to answer
J3A Would you be in favor of a "national repository" of qualified tools?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
J4. Have you ever been required to qualify a software tool that you believe did not require qualification?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
If "yes" (1 on J4) continue, otherwise skip to J5
J4A. Please specify why you believe tool qualification should not have been required.
J5. In your team's experience, about how big are the software development costs attributed to software tool
qualification, including meeting the objectives in DO-178B?
1 a negligible cost 4 a nearly prohibitive cost
2 a small cost 9 don't know/decline to answer
3 a substantial cost
J6. About how much software development time would you estimate is attributed to software tool qualification,
including meeting the objectives in DO-178B?
1 none or a negligible amount of time 4 a nearly prohibitive amount of time
2 a small amount of time 9 don't know/decline to answer
3 a substantial amount of time
J7. How much software development time and cost would your company devote to tool qualification if you were
not required to meet the objectives in DO-178B?
1 same as now 4 none
2 almost as much as now 5 unable to estimate
3 substantially less than now 9 don't know/decline to answer
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J8. In your opinion, are DO-178B's requirements for tool qualification ...
1 extremely valuable 4 of no value
2 somewhat valuable 5 unable to estimate
3 of marginal value 9 don't know/decline to answer
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SECTION K - SAFETY
K1. Do you believe that DO-178B adequately addresses software-related safety issues?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
K2. How often do you or your team perform additional activities outside of those required by DO-178B for
software-related safety issues?
1 never 4 for nearly all our projects
2 rarely - only exceptional projects 5 for every project
3 for quite a few projects 9 don't know/decline to answer
K3. Have you ever worked on a system, developed in compliance with DO-178B, in which a software-related
system error resulted in a service bulletin or Airworthiness Directive?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
If "yes" to K3 continue, otherwise skip to K5
K4. Which of the following best describes the cause(s) of these errors'? Select all answers that apply.
1 Erroneous understanding of high level software requirements
2 Erroneously developed high level or low level derived requirements
3 Erroneous software design decisions
4 Erroneous coding
5 other [please specify:]
9 no more/don't know/decline to answer
If "no" to K3 continue, otherwise skip to K6
K5. Which of the following best describes your opinion about the contribution of DO-178B to this absence of
software-related system error?
1 DO-178B made no contribution. 3 DO-178B made a major contribution.
2 DO-178B made a minor contribution. 9 don't know/decline to answer
K6. Is any safety-related information, other than DO-178B software level, given to your software developers
regarding the functions they are to implement in software?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
I[ "yes" to K6 continue, otherwise skip to K8
K7. What is the safety-related information and how is it used'?
K8. Which of the following best describes your team's procedure for handling derived requirements as defined in
DO-178B?
1 to create one or more "place-holder" requirements at a higher level to which the derived requirements can
be traced
2 to identify the derived requirements as such without traceability, and add rationale to the documentation
3 to identify the derived requirements as such, without traceability, and submit them to the safety
assessment process for review
4 to find existing and somewhat related requirements at a higher level to which the derived requirements can
be traced
5 do not identify the derived requirements as such, and treat them as an artifact of the design process
6 other [please specify:]
9 don't know/decline to answer
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K9. Have you or your team ever identified any derived requirement that resulted in a safety-related modification
to the system design'?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
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SECTION L - DER SYSTEM AND YOUR DER
** PROGRAM WILL AUTOMATE THIS SKIP: If you develop software for airborne systems ("yes" on A4 and "no"
on A5), please answer the following questions in this section.
L1. Do you or your software team work with a software DER?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
If "yes" to L1 continue, otherwise skip to M1
L2. Overall, how satisfied are you with the job your primary software DER is doing'? Are you:
1 very satisfied 4 somewhat dissatisfied
2 somewhat satisfied 5 very dissatisfied
3 neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 9 don't know/decline to answer
L3. In the past 3 years, has a software DER provided guidance that was disputed or overruled by the ACO?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
L4. In the past 3 years, has an ACO ever required additional information that the software DER on your project
did not make you aware of'?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
If "yes" to L4 continue, otherwise skip to L6
L5. Which of the following best describes why'?
1 DER error
2 too stringent ACO requirement
3 DER assumed we knew requirement of the ACO
9 don't know/decline to answer
L6. In the past 3 years, have you worked with a software DER with an inadequate background for what he or she
was approving'?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
If "yes" to L6 continue, otherwise skip to L8
L7. Which of the following describes the inadequacy'? Select all answers that apply.
1 lack of software engineering knowledge 4 other [please specify:]
2 lack of certification knowledge 9 no more/don't know/decline to answer
3 lack of DO-178B knowledge
L8. In the past 3 years, have you ever worked on a project with multiple software DERs having overlapping
responsibilities'?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
If "yes" to L8 continue, otherwise skip to LIO
L9. Have disagreements arisen among the software DERs that led to schedule delays or wasted resources'?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
L10. In the past 3 years, have you ever worked on TSO projects where software DERs were used to approve the
data?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
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Lll. In the past 3 years, have you ever had a software DER that disagreed with his predecessor on the project,
resulting in major project rework'?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
L12. In the past 3 years, has a software DER ever asked you to do anything technical that was not in written FAA
software policy and guidance'?
[DEFINITION: "Written policy and guidance" refers to the Federal Aviation Regulations, DO-178B, FAA
notices, FAA Orders, Advisory Circulars, and the FAA policy memos.]
1 no 3 yes, and the impact was substantial
2 yes, but the impact was minor 9 don't know/decline to answer
L12A. Based on your experience with software DERs, what is your opinion about the degree of delegation to
software DERs?
1 there is too little delegation to software DERs
2 the amount of delegation to software DERs is about right
3 there is too much delegation to software DERs
9 don't know/decline to answer
L13. Have your team's schedules and costs been adversely affected by the degree of delegation to software DERs?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
L15. In the past 3 years, have you been repeatedly dissatisfied with the services provided by a software DER on
your projects'?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
If "yes" to L15 continue, otherwise skip to L17
L16. Please indicate which ACO appointed the software DER(s) in question'?
1 Anchorage Aircraft Certification Office (ACE-115N)
2 Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office (ACE-115A)
3 Boston Aircraft Certification Office (ANE-150)
4 Chicago Aircraft Certification Office (ACE-115C)
5 Denver Aircraft Certification Office (ANM-100D)
6 Engine Certification Office (ANE-140)
7 Fort Worth Airplane Certification Office (ASW-150)
8 Fort Worth Rotorcraft Certification Office (ASW-170)
9 Fort Worth Special Certification Office (ASW-190)
10 Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ANM-100L)
11 New York Aircraft Certification Office (ANE-170)
12 Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ANM-100S)
13 Wichita Aircraft Certification Office (ACE-115W)
14 Brussels Aircraft Certification Office (AEU-100)
15 don't know/decline to answer
L17. Has your company ever made a delegation proposal to a software DER that the ACO rejected?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
If "yes" to L17 continue, otherwise skip to L21
L18. Why was the delegation proposal rejected'?
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L21. In your opinion, does the FAA provide adequate training for software DERs?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
If "no" to L21 continue, otherwise skip to L23
L22. What additional training should be provided'?
L23. Does your company provide software-DER-specific training'?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
If "yes" to L23 continue, otherwise skip to M1
L24. Which of the following areas are provided'? Select all answers that apply.
1 DERprocedures 4 DO-178B
2 software engineering 5 system engineering
3 certification process 9 no more/don't know/decline to answer
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SECTION GL - USING DERs FOR GROUND-BASED SYSTEMS
** PROGRAM WILL AUTOMATE THIS SKIP: If you have been directly involved with software for GROUND-
BASED systems ("yes" on A5), please answer the questions in this section. If NOT, please go to Section M.
GL1. In developing a ground-based system using DO-178B for software assurance in the past 3 years, have you
worked with an individual designated by the FAA as a software DER?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
If "yes" to GL1 continue, otherwise skip to Section M
GL2. Select each of the following ways the software DER was used. Select all answers that apply.
1 to help review the software architecture and allocate software assurance level
2 to set up the software development processes to ensure compliance with DO-178B
3 to review submissions of DO-178B documentation prior to submission to the FAA
4 other [please specify:]
9 no more/don't know/decline to answer
GL3. Overall, how would you rate your level of satisfaction with your experience with the software DER? Are
you:
1 very satisfied 4 somewhat dissatisfied
2 somewhat satisfied 5 very dissatisfied
3 neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 9 don't know/decline to answer
GL4. Did the use of a software DER as an advisor improve your ability to understand and comply with DO-178B?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
GL5. Did the use of a software DER as an advisor reduce the eftort involved in making improvements to software
architecture?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
GL6. Did the use of a software DER as an advisor reduce the delay in approval of submissions by the FAA?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
GL7. Some have suggested that the FAA should expand the authority of individuals granted software DER
authority under FAR Part 183, to allow for their use as a DER on ground-based system software assurance.
This would allow the FAA to rely on the DER to attest to the compliance of a submittal with DO-178B
objectives. Do you:
1 strongly agree 4 somewhat disagree
2 somewhat agree 5 strongly disagree
3 neither agree nor disagree 9 don't know/decline to answer
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SECTION M - GETTING INFORMATION YOU NEED
I-M. You're near the end of the survey now.
M1. Please indicate whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree,
or strongly disagree with the following statement:
Sufficient information is available for obtaining software approvals.
1 strongly agree 4 somewhat disagree
2 somewhat agree 5 strongly disagree
3 neither agree nor disagree 9 don't know/decline to answer
M1A. Please indicate whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree,
or strongly disagree with the following statement:
Sufficient information is available for interpreting DO-178B.
1 strongly agree 4 somewhat disagree
2 somewhat agree 5 strongly disagree
3 neither agree nor disagree 9 don't know/decline to answer
M2. Please indicate whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree,
or strongly disagree with the following statement:
Sufficient information is available to allow you to establish software levels.
1 strongly agree 4 somewhat disagree
2 somewhat agree 5 strongly disagree
3 neither agree nor disagree 9 don't know/decline to answer
M3. Please indicate whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree,
or strongly disagree with the following statement:
Sufficient information is available to assist you with your initial coordination regarding software with the
approving authority.
1 strongly agree 4 somewhat disagree
2 somewhat agree 5 strongly disagree
3 neither agree nor disagree 9 don't know/decline to answer
M4. Please indicate whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree,
or strongly disagree with the following statement:
Sufficient information is available to allow you to prepare for software audits by the approving authority.
1 strongly agree 4 somewhat disagree
2 somewhat agree 5 strongly disagree
3 neither agree nor disagree 9 don't know/decline to answer
M5. Please indicate whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree,
or strongly disagree with the following statement:
Sufficient information is available to allow you to obtain final approval from the approving authority.
1 strongly agree 4 somewhat disagree
2 somewhat agree 5 strongly disagree
3 neither agree nor disagree 9 don't know/decline to answer
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M6. Please indicate whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree,
or strongly disagree with the following statement:
Sufficient information is available to allow you to obtain TSO approvals.
1 strongly agree 5 strongly disagree
2 somewhat agree 8 not applicable
3 neither agree nor disagree 9 don't know/decline to answer
4 somewhat disagree
M7. Please indicate whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree,
or strongly disagree with the following statement:
Sufficient information is available to allow you to obtain PMA approvals.
1 strongly agree 5 strongly disagree
2 somewhat agree 8 not applicable
3 neither agree nor disagree 9 don't know/decline to answer
4 somewhat disagree
M7A. Please indicate whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree,
or strongly disagree with the following statement:
Sufficient information is available on resolving open software issues at final approval (e.g., problem reports).
1 strongly agree 5 strongly disagree
2 somewhat agree 8 not applicable
3 neither agree nor disagree 9 don't know/decline to answer
4 somewhat disagree
M8. When you need information about the software aspects of certification, which of the following sources do
you personally use? Select all answers that apply.
1 DO-178B
2 software DER
3 DER conferences
4 web site
5 public mailings
6 books in the local library
7 Federal Register
8 classes run by the FAA
9 company classes
10 other [please specify:]
11 no more/don't know/decline to answer
M9. By which of the following media do you think information should be made available to you from the FAA?
Please rank them in order of preference, where 1=most preferred medium.
An entry is required in each field unless a "9" is entered in the first field. Enter '9' in the first field if you can
not rank these media in terms of your preference
1 A single web site
2 Paper
3 Diskettes
4 CD-ROM
M9A. Is there another medium by which you think information should be made available?
1 yes 2 no
If "yes" continue, else skip to MIO
M9B. Please specify:
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M10. With what style of presentation do you think information should be made available from the FAA? Please
rank your top three choices in order of preference, where l=most preferred medium.
Enter rank, then press [ENTER] to move to next item. Enter '9' for any item not in your top three.
1 documents
2 interactive video
3 video tape
4 web-based training
5 computer-based training
6 classroom
M10A. Is there another style of presentation by which you think information should be made available'?
1 yes 2 no
If "yes" continue, else skip to next section
M10B. Please specify:
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SECTION P - APPROPRIATENESS OF DO-178B FOR GROUND-BASED SYSTEMS
** PROGRAM WILL AUTOMATE THIS SKIP: If you have been directly involved with software for GROUND-
BASED systems ("yes" on A5), please answer the questions in this section. If NOT, please go to Section Q.
P1. Do you believe there are qualitative differences in the development of ground-based systems--as contrasted
with airborne systems--that make DO-178B inappropriate for ground-based systems?
1 yes, DO-178B would be inappropriate
2 no, it would be appropriate as is
3 DO-178B could be adapted to ground-based systems if minor modifications were made
9 don't know/decline to answer
If "yes" to PI continue, otherwise skip to P3
P2a. For the following area, please indicate if you believe that the assurance mechanisms prescribed by DO-178B
are appropriate for software used in ground-based systems.
project planning
1 yes (DO-178B is appropriate) 2 no 9 don't know
P2b. For the following area, please indicate if you believe that the assurance mechanisms prescribed by DO-178B
are appropriate for software used in ground-based systems.
requirements definition
1 yes (DO-178B is appropriate) 2 no 9 don't know
P2c. For the following area, please indicate if you believe that the assurance mechanisms prescribed by DO-178B
are appropriate for software used in ground-based systems.
design capture
1 yes (DO-178B is appropriate) 2 no 9 don't know
P2d. For the following area, please indicate if you believe that the assurance mechanisms prescribed by DO-178B
are appropriate for software used in ground-based systems.
coding
1 yes (DO-178B is appropriate) 2 no 9 don't know
P2e. For the following area, please indicate if you believe that the assurance mechanisms prescribed by DO-178B
are appropriate for software used in ground-based systems.
reviews, analysis, and testing
1 yes (DO-178B is appropriate) 2 no 9 don't know
P2f. For the following area, please indicate if you believe that the assurance mechanisms prescribed by DO-178B
are appropriate for software used in ground-based systems.
coordination of commissioning
1 yes (DO-178B is appropriate) 2 no 9 don't know
P3. Do you believe that an independent authority (as the ACO is to an airborne applicant) would be an
appropriate model for commissioning of ground-based equipment in the national airspace system?
1 yes 2 no 9 don't know/decline to answer
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FINAL SECTION - GENERAL COMMENTS
I-Q. Finally, just a few last questions about your overall views.
Q3. Suppose you were in charge of the task of developing DO-178C--the next version of DO-178B. What areas
of this document do you believe are most in need of revision?
Q4. Thinking of the software approval process in its entirety (not just the written guidelines), what aspects are in
greatest need of improvement?
That's all the questions we have for you. Thank you for taking the time to tell us your experiences and opinions.
These will be of tremendous help to the technical team in making recommendations to the FAA for streamlining the
process.
When you are done with this interview program, please place the floppy disk in the disk mailer and use the return
envelope to return it to CSR right away.
Thanks again!
91
92
Appendix B
US Oeportment
of TronslDortohon
Federal Avlatton
Administration
800 Independence Ave., S_W
Washington, DC 20591
NAY 14 1999
Dear Members of the Streamlining Software Aspects
of Certification Team:
We would hke to extend our appreciation to the dedication you have brought to your mission to
recommend means of streamlining the processes by which software developed for airborne and
ground-based systems are certified or approved by the Federal Aviation Admtmstratlon Going
beyond anecdotal evidence, you have been able to garner verifable evidence through your
workshops and survey, Surveying over seventy companies and receiving a 72% valid return
rate on the survey is not only a sign of a job well done by the techmcal team, it demonstrates in
a measurable way, the level of mterest and support that you have gamed from the avionics
community
The Federal Aviation Admlmstratton acknowledges the receipt of your recommendatmns.
Whde these recommendations continue to be reviewed by the FAA, it appears that some of the
issues are currently being addressed and should be resolved m a short t_me frame. Additionally,
your recommendations lend credence to the RTCA Cerhficanon Task Force 4 report by
supporting some of thelr assertions with hard data with respect to software. At this time we
would hke to extend our commitment to the SSAC, as well as to the partlmpants of the survey
and workshops, to rewew each of the recommendations and dehver a response to them by
September 30, 1999.
Smcerely,
Daniel J Mehan
Assistant Administrator for Information
Services and Chief Informatmn Officer
Thomas E, McSweeney
Assocmte Admmzstrator for Regulation and
Certification
_.J+-9
Steven J Brown
Associate Admlmstrator for Air Traffic
Services
_steven Zaidman
Assocmte Administrator for Research and
Acqmsinons
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